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VfCTORIA UNIVERSITY or WELLINGTON 
ABSTRACT 
The United Nations Security Council has undertaken a unique course of action in 
its response to terrorism. The Security Council responded to this global threat 
from non-State actors by obliging all States to upgrade their capacities to fight 
terrorism and by imposing a sanctions regime. Given the nature of the threat, the 
response of the Security Council has necessarily had to be cooperative in nature 
rather than coercive. To this end, the Security Council has created subsidiary 
committees which have largely sought to maintain the commitment of States in 
their efforts against terrorism. 
This paper analyses the practice of the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies 
in order to provide a true understanding of the Security Council's response to this 
threat to international peace and security. Its response has not gone without 
criticism. In particular, the Security Council's recent adoption ofresolutions of a 
legislative character has caused major concern. The fundamental tenet of 
international law, that there exists no international body capable of passing 
legislation for the international community, has been questioned in light of these 
developments. Further, the manner in which the Security Council has sanctioned 
non-State actors raises serious issues of due process. 
This paper submits that the ultimate efficacy of such actions depends on their 
perceived legitimacy. The threat is of such a nature that it requires a unified 
response from all States. Thus, in order to that the Security Council remains both 
effective and credible the Security Council must be responsive to the various 
concerns of Member States. 
Word Count: 15323 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The response of the United Nations Security Council to the threat of 
terrorism in the years following the September 11 attacks in 2001 has been 
unprecedented. The Security Council has embarked on an ambitious and unique 
course in its response to the threat terrorism poses to international peace and 
security. 
Given its mandate of having the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, 1 the Security Council has 
appropriately taken a lead role in the fight against terrorism. It has responded in 
two ways. Firstly, it has prescribed a range of binding obligations on all Member 
States, requiring them to progressively increase their capabilities to prevent and 
suppress terrorism. In doing so, the Security Council has committed itself to a 
sustained and long-term approach. Secondly, the Security Council has itself 
taken the fight to the non-State actors who engage in terrorism through a 
sanctions regime. The current sanctions regime targets Al-Qaida, the Taliban 
and their associates and seeks to deprive them of the means to commit acts of 
terrorism. 2 
In order to assist the Security Council in these tasks, the Security Council 
has created a number of subsidiary bodies. These bodies have been instrumental 
in maintaining the commitment of States in their efforts against terrorism. They 
have become the focus point of the international effort against terrorism. Thus, 
any analysis of the Security Council's response to terrorism requires an 
understanding of the practice of these subsidiary bodies. 
The goal of this paper is to examine the detailed practice of the Security 
Council and its subsidiary bodies in order to provide clarity on the particular path 
that the Security Council has embarked upon. The efficacy and also the 
legitimacy of the Security Council's actions can then be analysed. The issues 
1 UN Charter, art 24. 
2 This paper takes the spelling of "Al-Qaida" as is commonly used by the Security Council. This 
writer is aware that it is often spelt "Al Qaeda". 
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that this paper raises are similar to some of the traditional inquiries into Security 
Council action; that is, the extent of the Security Council's Chapter VII powers 
and the justness of particular Security Council sanctions. 
In terms of the extent of the Security Council's powers, much of the 
recent debate has surrounded the Security Council's assumption of "legislative 
powers", beginning with the adoption of Resolution 1373 (2001). Some argue 
that the Security Council does not have the legal mandate or the democratic 
legitimacy to be a "global legislature". This paper will submit that in certain 
circumstances it is legitimate for the Security Council to legislate. The nature of 
threats such as terrorism necessitates this response. However, the circumstances 
in which the Security Council can legislate are limited and the Security Council 
must remain responsive to the concerns of States if it wishes to remain effective 
and credible. 
The Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime has also given rise to a lot of 
debate. In particular, the way in which the particular non-State actors are 
targeted raises a number of due process issues. There exist very few protections 
in the management of the list of designated Al-Qaida and Taliban members. This 
paper will submit that Security Council must implement due process protections 
in order to ensure the legitimacy of the regime and its effective implementation. 
II THE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTIONS 
The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon 
was not the first time the world had experienced the wrath of terrorism. Nor was 
it the first time terrorism had invoked a response from the Security Council. 3 
However, the severity of the attacks and the realisation of vulnerability that 
followed energised the world community to take a more aggressive approach. 
3 For example, the Security Council has dealt with the 1988 Pan Am bombing over Lockerbie (Resolutions 731 (21 January 1992) S/Res/731(1992) and 748 (31 March 1992) S/Res/748(1992)); the 1995 attempted murder of the Egyptian President (Resolution 1054 (26 April 1996) 
S/Res/1054(1996)); the 1998 US Embassy bombings (Resolution 1189 (13 August 1998) S/Res/1189(1998)); the threat posed by Al-Qaida and the Taliban (UNSC Resolution 1267 (15 
October 1999) S/RES/1267(1999)); and terrorism generally (Resolution 1269 (19 October 1999) S/Res/1269(1999)). 
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The response of the Security Council was the imposition of general, 
"legislative", obligations through Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004). 
This section seeks to detail these Resolutions and the practice of the subsidiary 
bodies they created in order to provide a base for an analysis of the legitimacy of 
these actions and ultimately an analysis of their effectiveness. 
A Resolution 1373 and the Counter-Terrorism Committee 
1 Resolution 1373 
Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) is the heart of the international 
effort against terrorism. 4 Acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council 
declared international terrorism to be a threat to international peace and security 
and imposed a host of binding obligations on all Member States to suppress and 
prevent terrorism. 
The financing of terrorism is a major aspect of the Resolution. States 
were called upon to suppress and prevent the financing of terrorist acts, to 
criminalise the wilful financing of terrorism, to freeze all economic resources of 
terrorists, and to prohibit nationals and those within their territories from making 
any financial or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to those who 
commit terrorist acts. States themselves must also refrain from providing any 
form of support to terrorists. 
A general obligation was imposed on States to take steps to prevent 
terrorist acts. States were obliged to deny safe havens to those who finance, plan, 
support, or commit terrorist acts and to prevent the movement of terrorists by 
effective border controls. States were also obliged to ensure that those who 
finance, plan or perpetrate terrorist acts are brought to justice and to ensure that 
such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws. 
Furthermore, an obligation was imposed on States to afford each other assistance 
4 UNSC Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001) S/RES/1373(2001). 
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in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings relating to the 
financing or support of terrorist acts. Finally, States were called upon to become 
parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols 
relating to terrorism. 
Resolution 1373 (2001) is an example of Security Council "legislation". 
It imposes general obligations that are not limited in time on all 191 Member 
States. 5 Many of the obligations draw from the language in the twelve 
conventions relating to terrorism, which are binding only on States that have 
become parties to them.6 But Resolution 1373 (2001) did more than just impose 
obligations on States regardless of whether they had signed the relevant 
conventions. It delivered a "strong operational message: get going on effective 
measures now."7 
Importantly, the resolution did not define "terrorism".8 In doing so, the 
Security Council avoided the debate that has stalled the United Nations from 
concluding a comprehensive convention on terrorism over the past few years.9 
By avoiding the politically divisive issue, the Security Council sought to gather 
support from all States in the fight against terrorism. However, the effect has 
been to give States a vast discretion to decide the extent of their obligations 
under Resolution 1373 (2001). 10 
2 The Counter-Terrorism Committee 
5 Exactly why Resolution 1373 is considered "legislation" is discussed further below. 6 In particular, many of the financing obligations are drawn from the International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (9 December 1999) 39 ILM 270. For a list of the 
other conventions see UN Acts Against Terrorism <http://www.un.org/terrorism> (last accessed 
1 October 2005). 
7 UNSC (18 January 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4453, 4. 8 The Counter-Terrorism Committee has also decided not to define "terrorism". The Committee 
decided that they had a fair idea of what is blatant terrorism, and if necessary, they will decide by 
consensus whether an act is terrorism (UNSC (18 January 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4453 5). 9 
Thalif Deen "UN Member States Struggle to Define" (2005) Global Policy Forum 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org> (last accessed 21 August 2005). An Ad Hoe Committee, created 
by UNGA Resolution 51/210 (17 December 1996), is charged with elaborating a comprehensive 
convention on international terrorism. India introduced the current draft in 2000 (UNGA "Draft 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism: Working Document Submitted by India" (28 August 2000) NC.6/5511). 
10 This issue is discussed more in-depth below. 
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(a) Introduction 
Resolution 1373 (2001) established a Committee of the Security Council, 
the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), consisting of all members of the 
Security Council. Its task is to "monitor implementation" of the resolution. 11 
The resolution gave no guidance as to what this role would entail or how the 
CTC would operate. 
It is notable therefore that the CTC is now described as being the "hub of 
a global, long-term effort to combat terrorism."12 The following sections will 
trace the practice of this committee in order to shed light on the true role the CTC 
plays. 
(b) The goal of the CTC 
The CTC is not a sanctions committee. It does not seek to identify any 
terrorists. Nor does it sit as a tribunal for judging States. 13 Instead, the goal of 
the CTC is to maintain the impetus of States to increase their capacities to fight 
terrorism. As Sir Jeremy Greenstock, British Ambassador to the United Nations 
and the first Chairman of the CTC stated: 14 
Our aim is to raise the average level of Governmental performance against 
terrorism around the globe. This means upgrading the capacity of each 
nation's legislation and executive machinery to fight terrorism. Every 
Government holds a responsibility for ensuring that there is no weak part of 
the chain .. . We must do this together, and everyone has a contribution to 
make. 
In order to achieve this goal, the CTC established a dialogue with every 
Member State to find out what measures Governments had put in place already 
11 UNSC Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001) S/RES/1373(2001) para 6. 
12 Eric Rosand "Security Council Resolution 1373, The Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the 
Fight Against Terrorism" Am J Int'I L 333, 338 ["Security Council Resolution 1373, The 
Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism"]. 
13 UNSC (18 January 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4453, 5. 
14 UNSC (18 January 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4453, 5. 
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and what more needed to be done. 15 In this effort, the CTC is guided by the 
principles of cooperation, transparency and equal treatment. 16 
Sir Jeremy Greenstock believed that cooperation had to be an essential 
hallmark of the CTC's operations. 17 This is because although Resolution 1373 
(2001) is mandatory on all Member States, the nature of the obligations requires 
them to be willingly and purposefully implemented if they are to have any effect. 
It is for this reason that to date the CTC has refrained from judging States 
and condemning those that have been complacent in their efforts. This does not 
mean that the CTC does not expect every State to work as fast as possible to 
implement the far-reaching obligations. 18 But it does mean that attention is paid 
to making sure that States do not feel alienated and threatened. The focus is on 
assisting States rather than condemning them. Eric Rosand submits that this 
focus has enabled the CTC to gamer support from virtually all 191 Member 
States. 19 
(c) Monitoring implementation 
Resolution 1373 (2001) called upon all States to report to the CTC within 
90 days and thereafter according to a timetable proposed by the CTC, on the 
steps they have taken to implement the Resolution. These initial reports and the 
continued dialogue via follow up questioning and subsequent reporting have 
been the primary means by which the CTC has monitored implementation of the 
resolution. 20 
15 UNSC (4 October 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4618, 5. 
16 
Counter-Terrorism Committee "Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work" (16 
October 2001) S/AC.40/2001/CRP.1, para l(c) . 
17 UNSC (4 October 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4618, 5. 
18 UNSC (4 October 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4618, 5. 
19 
"Security Council Resolution 1373, The Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against 
Terrorism", above n 12, 335. 
20 UNSC (18 January 2005) Verbatim Record S/PV.5113, 3. 
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In recognition of the broad scope of the Resolution, the CTC broke down 
the focus of implementation and reporting into three stages.21 Stage A required 
States to focus initially on having adequate legislation in place covering all 
aspects of the resolution. Stage B aimed at having effective executive machinery 
in place to combat terrorism. Stage C envisages the CTC continuing dialogue 
with States who already have in place adequate legislation and executive 
machinery, addressing the level of interstate cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism. 22 
The CTC divides the task of analysing States' reports between three Sub-
Committees, each with responsibility for certain States. Each sub-committee 
reviews the reports with the support of independent experts in the fields of: 
legislative drafting; financial, customs, immigration and extradition law and 
practice; police and law enforcement; illegal arms trafficking; and any other 
relevant area of expertise.23 As part of this review process, the relevant Sub-
Committees may also invite the State concerned to discuss its report. 
The experts then draft responses asking a number of follow-up questions 
which are to be answered in the State's subsequent report. It is this process of 
State reporting and response by the CTC that has allowed the Committee to 
monitor what action is being taken by Member States to increase their capacity to 
prevent and suppress terrorism. This dialogue has also enabled the Committee to 
identify those States that are in need of assistance to implement the 
counterterrorism measures. 
(d) Technical assistance 
21 "Security Council Resolution 1373, The Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against 
Terrorism", above n 12, 335. 
22 UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee "Report by the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee on the problems encountered in the implementation of Security Council resolution 
1373 (2001)" (26 January 2004) S/2004/70, 11. 
23 See UNSC Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (23 October 2001) Note Verbale 
SCA/20/01(4). 
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The facilitation of technical assistance to States is one of the main 
components of the CTC's work.24 While the CTC stresses that responsibility for 
implementing Resolution 1373 (2001), including the preparation of reports to the 
Committee, rests with States, the Committee also recognises that many States are 
willing to enhance their capacities to combat terrorism but do not have the 
technical capabilities. 25 The CTC plays a major role in this regard, not by 
directly providing technical assistance to States, but by acting as a switchboard 
between the requests and the donors of assistance.26 The CTC works with States 
to identify their individual needs and those who can provide assistance. 
To this end, the CTC maintains a Matrix of Assistance Requests, which 
offers centralised and updated information on requests received from States for 
assistance and on any assistance programmes offered by providers, including 
international, regional and subregional organisations.27 This information allows 
providers to assess the needs of individual countries and to tailor their 
programmes accordingly. 
The CTC has also developed the Directory of Counter-Terrorism 
Information and Sources of Assistance. 28 The Directory is a source of 
information on best practices, model laws and available assistance programmes 
in the area of counter-terrorism. It is contributed to from a wide range of States 
and organisations wishing to share their expertise in matters relating to 
Resolution 1373 (2001). 
The role the CTC plays in facilitating assistance to States focusses on 
ensuring adequate legislation is in place and best practices are available for the 
24 
UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee "Report by the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee on the problems encountered in the implementation of Security Council resolution 
1373 (2001)" (26 January 2004) s12004no, 8. 
25 UNSC Counter Terrorism Committee "Work Programme of the Counter-Terrorism Committee 
(I July- 30 September 2005)" (29 June 2005) S/2005/421, para 10. 
26 
UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee "Report by the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee on the problems encountered in the implementation of Security Council resolution 
1373 (2001)" (26 January 2004) S/2004nO, 8. 
27 
The matrix can be accessed from the Counter-Terrorism Committee's website: 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/index.html> (last accessed 21 August 2005). 
28 
The database can be accessed from the Counter-Terrorism Committee's website: 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/l373/index.htm1> (last accessed 21 August 2005). 
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executive to follow. The CTC does not go further than this and assist States in 
their active operations against terrorists. The CTC is not a law-enforcement 
agency.29 It does not facilitate the sharing of intelligence on terrorist activities 
nor seek to prevent or prosecute specific terrorist acts. Rather, the CTC seeks to 
ensure that States have the framework in place so that such activities can be 
readily carried out by States. 
(e) Revitalisation 
On 14 November 2003, the Chairman of the CTC submitted a report to 
the Security Council on the problems encountered and the challenges that lay 
ahead in the implementation of Resolution 1373 (2001).30 The conclusion of this 
analysis was that the structures and procedures of the CTC needed to be 
reconsidered. This was necessary given the major roles that the CTC was 
undertaking:31 
[T]he CTC has evolved to assume a more proactive role in the dialogue with 
Member States, in evaluating the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), 
in facilitating technical assistance to Member States and in promoting closer 
cooperation with regional and subregional organisations. 
In order to maintain and strengthen these roles, the CTC proposed that it 
should be "revitalised".32 Change was required in order to make the CTC "more 
operational, more proactive, and more visible."33 Thus, through Resolution 1535 
(2004), the CTC was restructured. 34 It now consists of the Plenary and the 
Bureau. The Plenary comprises the Security Council's Member States and 
focuses on strategic and policy decisions. 35 
29 UNSC (27 June 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4561, 3. 
30 UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee "Report by the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee on the problems encountered in the implementation of Security Council resolution 
1373 (2001)" (26 January 2004) S/2004/70. 
31 UNSC (4 March 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4921, 3-4. 
32 UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee "Proposal for the Revitalisation of the Counter-
Terrorism Committee" (19 February 2004) S/2004/124, 2. 
33 UNSC (4 March 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4921, 3. 
34 UNSC Resolution 1535 (26 March 2004) S/RES/1535(2004). This Resolution endorsed the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee's report on its own revitalisation and implemented the structure 
Eroposed by that report. 
5 UNSC (4 March 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4921, 4. 
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The Bureau is composed of the Chair and Vice-Chairs and is assisted by 
the Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) which is headed by the 
Executive Director and staffed by up to 20 experts and Secretariat personnel. 
The main task of the CTED is to support and advise the Plenary in all its 
functions and to carry out the day-to-day work of the CTC.36 A sunset clause 
was included for 31 December 2007, under which the Executive Directorate will 
continue to exist only if the Security Council so decides.37 
The new structure was designed to enable to Committee to be more agile 
and efficient in helping Member States comply with Resolution 1373 (2001).38 
As States have moved from stage A, which relates to ensuring adequate anti-
terrorist legislation is place, to stage B, which focuses on actual implementation 
of these measures, more resources were required for the CTC to adequately 
monitor what was actually happening on the ground.39 
One new tool recognised by Resolution 1535 (2004) as necessary for the 
CTC to fulfil its mandate is on the ground visits to States. 40 The ability of 
written reports to give a true understanding of the measures put in place by 
governments is limited. The CTC has recognised that visits are needed "in order 
to develop a deeper and more direct dialogue with national Governments, to 
enhance monitoring of the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), and to 
36 UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee "Organisational Plan for the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee Executive Directorate (12 August 2004) S/2004/642, 6. The plan sets out the 
following priorities for the Executive Directorate: To ensure the collection of information for 
monitoring purposes; to ensure the comprehensive follow-up of all the Committee's decisions; to 
strengthen the facilitation of technical assistance; to enhance cooperation among international, 
regional and subregional organisations; to ensure consistency among all activities of the CTC 
while maintaining a tailored approach to each State; to provide adequate and complete follow-up 
of all the Committee's decisions; and to ensure the correct exchange of information at the proper 
level. 
37 UNSC Resolution 1535 (26 March 2004) S/RES/1535(2004), para 2. 
38 UN News Centre "Press Conference by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Chairman" (26 
March 2004) <http://www.un.org/news> (last accessed 21 August 2005). 
39 Note: The Counter-Terrorism Committee has identified a need to re-evaluate the stages. While 
the categorisation of the CTC's work into stages A, B and C proved useful in the early days of 
the CTC's work, the CTC believes that the categorisation has become progressively artificial and 
may limit the ability of the CTC to effectively monitor implementation. See UNSC Counter-
Terrorism Committee "Report by the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on the problems 
encountered in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001)" (26 January 2004) 
S/2004/70. 
40 UNSC Resolution 1535 (26 March 2004) S/RES/1535(2004). 
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ensure a more accurate assessment of the capacities of States and of their needs 
in terms of technical assistance for the full implementation of the resolution."41 
(f) Accomplishments 
The initial response of Member States to Resolution 1373 (2001) was 
remarkable. With the horrors of September 11 firmly in people's minds, the 
following months saw a flurry of activity among the international community. 
Virtually all States were eager in their support for the Security Council's efforts 
against terrorism. 
The efforts of the CTC in its first year of operation in turning this general 
support into practical action should not be understated. In its first year, 174 
Member States had reported to the CTC on action taken and planned. The CTC 
had responded to almost all of those first reports and had begun to review the 86 
follow-up reports States had provided.42 
The initial accomplishments of the CTC were emphatically recognised by 
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, who made the following statement before the 
Security Council on 18 January 2002: "The work of the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee and the cooperation it has received from Member States have been 
unprecedented and exemplary."43 
Member States also praised the work of the CTC during the Security 
Council's open meeting on 4 October 2002.44 The CTC was applauded for its 
success in encouraging and ensuring implementation of Resolution 1373 (2001). 
41 UNSC (18 January 2005) Verbatim Record S/PV.5113, 4. 
42 UNSC (4 October 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4618, 6. 
43 UNSC (18 January 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4453, 2. 
44 UNSC (4 October 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4618, 6.4618. For example, the representative 
of Mexico stated: "In the year that has elapsed since its establishment, the Committee has 
demonstrated its dynamism and its importance to the United Nations." The representative of 
Ireland stated: "The work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, under the leadership of 
Ambassador Greenstock, has been remarkable." The representative of Singapore stated: "When 
the CTC was first set up exactly one year ago, the challenge given to it to spearhead the global 
campaign against terrorism looked insurmountable. Hence, by all measures, the Committee has 
done extremely well over the past year, given the resource and time constraints it faces. This 
remarkable feat could not have been accomplished without the brilliant leadership and passion of 
Ambassador Greenstock as Chairman." 
15 
The core of Resolution 1373 (2001), the obligation of all States to strengthen 
their legal and administrative capacities to combat terrorism, was being met with 
the passing of a vast quantity of antiterrorism legislation around the world. 
Furthermore, for the first time, a global inventory was being undertaken of 
measures States were adopting. The CTC had also succeeded in accelerating the 
pace of ratification of the twelve international terrorism conventions and 
protocols.45 
(g) Challenges 
The role of the CTC will be long-term. There is no end date on 
Resolution 1373 (2001). Indeed, the nature of the obligations imposed is such 
that they are not limited in time. Thus, the CTC has stated that it will not declare 
any State to be "fully compliant" with Resolution 1373 (2001).46 States must not 
only put in place the requisite legislation but must also ensure its effective 
implementation.47 This requires long-term commitments to ensure that adequate 
policing structures are put in place and to ensure a sense of vigour is maintained 
in enforcement and cooperation with other States. 
Stimulating this capacity building is a daunting task for the CTC. Many 
countries simply lack the resources to enforce the legislation. Developing 
countries often lack the capacity to deal effectively with security, border controls, 
the movement of criminals, the illegal circulation of firearms, and the financing 
of terrorist networks.48 Compliance for such countries will be a long battle that 
will require material assistance from other States. The task of the CTC is 
therefore to facilitate the provision of not merely technical law-drafting 
assistance, but substantial operational assistance to such countries. 
45 
UNSC (4 October 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4618, 6. In July 2001, only Botswana and the 
United Kingdom had ratified all twelve instruments. By October 2002, 24 States had done so. 
46 UNSC (4 October 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4618, 5. 
47 The obligation to ensure adequate legislation is in place is also ongoing as the Security Council 
is continuously adding to the obligations. See for example UNSC Resolution 1624 (14 
September 2005) S/RES/1624(2005), the latest piece of Security Council legislation. This 
resolution requires States to adopt such measures as may be necessary to prohibit by law 
incitement to commit a terrorist acts or acts. The Counter-Terrorism Committee is directed to 
include in its dialogue with States their efforts to implement this resolution. 
48 UNSC (4 March 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4921, 12. 
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There are also some countries that lack the political will to implement 
these measures. Now that the CTC is engaging in ensuring that the operational 
side of implementation is adequate, it has become necessary for it to distinguish 
between States that are not fulfilling their obligations because they lack the 
necessary capacity, and States that are not complying due to lack of political will. 
The implementation of legislation is often mere window-dressing that does not 
evidence any substantive increase in a State's capacity to fight terrorism. It will 
be a continual challenge for the CTC to ascertain the true state of affairs. 
This is particularly so given the recent drop in the level of reporting by 
States. Although all 191 Member States eventually submitted first round reports, 
the response has not been universally maintained.49 Reporting according to the 
timetable proposed by the CTC is an obligation required of States by Resolution 
1373 (2001).50 The concern of the CTC over the failure of States to meet this 
obligation reached the stage that on 16 December 2004 the Chairman of the CTC 
presented to the President of the Security Council an official list of 75 Member 
States that had not met the reporting deadlines for the submission of outstanding 
second, third and fourth reports.51 
The Committee has recognised that the reasons for not reporting often 
pertain, to a great extent, to lack of capacity and reporting fatigue. 52 Given that 
State reporting in the backbone of the CTC's ability to monitor, it is essential that 
States continue to report their compliance. Furthermore, the CTC should reduce 
its reliance on written reports by increasing the number of State visits. These 
visits are essential to the monitoring of actual operational capacities. 
49 UNSC (18 January 2005) Verbatim Record S/PV.5113, 3. 
50 This fact and the importance of timely reporting has been reiterated to States numerous times. 
See for example UNSC "Work programme of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (1 July - 30 
September 2005)" (29 June 2005) S/2005/421, 3. See also UNSC Resolution 1456 (20 January 
2003) S/RES/1456(2003), para 4. See also the comments of the representative of Denmark in an 
open Security Council meeting (UNSC (18 January 2005) Verbatim Record S/PV.5113, 5): "It is 
of great concern that a growing number of countries are falling behind in their reporting 
obligations. We recognise that reports alone do not stop the work of terrorists. Nevertheless, 
those reports remain the backbone of the CTC's ability to monitor the actual steps taken on the 
wound." 
1 UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee "List of Late Reports" (20 December 2004) S/2004/982. 
52 UNSC (20 July 2005) Verbatim Record S/PV.5229, 3. 
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One major problem is that the CTC has no teeth to deal with countries 
that lack political will. Although the CTC has identified those that have failed to 
submit reports to the CTC in a timely manner, it does not go further and name 
and shame States that do not have the political will to implement Resolution 
1373 (2001). This is worrying because there comes a point when more than 
mere encouragement is necessary for States to implement their obligations. 
The Security Council should consider what measures can be utilised to 
coerce unwilling States. This could involve naming and shaming. It could also 
involve, as the High Level Panel Report suggested, the development of 
predetermined sanctions for State non-compliance.53 The challenge will be to do 
this while maintaining the base support that is so vitally necessary for effective 
implementation of the counter-terrorism obligations. 
B Resolution 1540 and the 1540 Committee 
1 Resolution 1540 
Resolution 1540 (2004) is similar to Resolution 1373 (2001) in that it is 
another example of Security Council "legislation". It also imposes general 
obligations on all States that require extensive changes to domestic laws. The 
obligations imposed by Resolution 1540 (2004) are designed to stop the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors.54 The Security 
Council was concerned that the existing non-proliferation regimes did not 
adequately deal with the risk that non-State actors "may acquire, develop, traffic 
in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery", 
and so acted under Chapter VII to close this gap in international law.55 
53 
UN Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change "A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility" (2 December 2004) N59!565, 47. 
54 
UNSC Resolution 1540 (28 April 2004) S/RES/1540(2004). 
55 
See the preamble of UNSC Resolution 1540 (28 April 2004) S/RES/1540(2004). 
18 
Resolution 1540 (2004) seeks to ensure that all Member States refrain 
from supporting non-State actors' attempts to acquire these weapons and pass 
laws criminalising such activities by non-State actors.56 It also obliges States to 
establish domestic controls to prevent proliferation of these weapons, such as 
security measures, physical protection measures, effective border controls, and 
export and trans-shipment controls.57 
2 The 1540 Committee 
A Committee of the Security Council (the 1540 Committee), consisting 
of all members of the Council, was created to report to the Security Council on 
the implementation of the Resolution.58 States were called upon to present a first 
report to the Committee within six months of the adoption of the resolution on 
the steps taken or intended to be taken to implement the resolution. 59 By 5 
December 2004, over a month after the due date of the reports, only 86 States 
had submitted their national reports. 60 By 20 July 2005, 118 States had 
submitted reports.61 
Like the CTC, the 1540 Committee decided to establish three 
subcommittees to share in the task of reviewing States' reports. 62 There is 
currently a group of eight experts supporting this work.63 In considering national 
reports, the 1540 Committee has already identified both needs and offers of 
assistance in the implementation of the resolution. No doubt the Committee will 
become a switchboard for assistance donors and requesters as has the CTC. 
The goal of Resolution 1540 (2004) is similar in theme to that of 
Resolution 1373 (2001). It seeks a global upgrade of legislative and 
administrative machineries in order to reduce the possibility that terrorists will 
56 UNSC Resolution 1540 (28 April 2004) S/RES/1540(2004), para I and 2. 
57 UNSC Resolution 1540 (28 April 2004) S/RES/1540(2004), para 3. 
58 UNSC Resolution 1540 (28 April 2004) S/RES/1540(2004), para 4. 
59 UNSC Resolution 1540 (28 April 2004) S/RES/1540(2004), para 4. 
60 UNSC (9December 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.5097, 3. 
61 UNSC (20 July 2005) Verbatim Record S/PV.5229, 7. 
62 UNSC (9December 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.5097, 3. 
63 UNSC (20 July 2005) Verbatim Record S/PV.5229, 6. 
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obtain weapons of mass destruction. The promoters of the Resolution stressed 
that it was not about coercion or enforcement.64 Rather, the 1540 Committee 
would be "the heart of a cooperative approach, allowing countries to compare 
experience, to establish best practice and to identify areas where technical 
assistance is needed. "65 
III LEGITIMACY OF THE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTIONS 
A Introduction 
The Security Council Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) and the 
practice of the two Security Council subsidiary bodies raise some serious issues 
concerning the legitimacy of the Security Council's actions. These issues form 
part of a wider discourse that has been occurring regarding the legitimacy of 
contemporary international law. Legitimacy questions are being raised due to 
developments in international law that are increasingly limiting the realm of 
national self-governance.66 
Firstly, international law is expanding into substantive issues that have 
previously been the domain of national law creation processes. Secondly, the 
procedure by which international law is being generated increasingly attenuates 
the link between state consent and the creation of an obligation under 
international law. 67 For example, treaties today increasingly delegate law 
making authority to treaty-based bodies. Although States consent to the creation 
of such a framework, the specific rights and obligations are created by these 
bodies without any real consent.68 
Weiler describes such developments as having led to a new form of 
international law creation, which he conceptualises as "international 
64 UNSC (22 April 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4950, 12. 
65 UNSC (22 April 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4950, 12. 
66 See Mattias Kumm "The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of 
Analysis" (2004) 14 EJll... 907. 
67 See Kumm, above n 66, 914. 
68 See Kumm, above n 66, 914. 
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governance".69 This concept, in recognising the decline of the traditional view of 
international law being a consent-based order, raises important issues of how 
contemporary international law making can be legitimised. The immediate 
impulse is to compare it with domestic governance. 70 The conclusion one 
reaches with such a comparison is that international governance is "governance 
without government". 71 It lacks the branches of government between which 
power is separated at the State level, and in particular, it lacks a democratic 
foundation. 
The passing of the two legislative resolutions (as summarised above) by 
the Security Council exhibits a form of "international governance". As such, it 
has become necessary to question the legitimacy of what the Security Council is 
doing. The goal of such an inquiry is not limited to a narrow legality inquiry, but 
seeks to elucidate the core issues that will determine how successful the Security 
Council will be in the coming years in being the bastion of international peace 
and security. 
The legitimacy inquiry is necessary because it is inextricably linked to the 
willingness of States to cooperate with the Security Council's collective security 
efforts. Indeed, some commentators have submitted that there is only a moral 
duty to obey international law to the extent that it is legitimate.72 The question of 
legality therefore, only takes us so far. Although legality provides a prima facie 
case for legitimacy,73 a more in depth inquiry is required in order to determine 
the true capabilities of the Security Council. 
B Security Council "Legislation" 
69 J Weiler "The Geology of International Law - Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy" (2004) 
64 ZaoRV 527. 
70 Although there is a need for caution when analysing international Jaw on the basis of criteria 
derived from municipal Jaw, there is no need to completely refrain from such an analysis. See 
Ian Brownlie The Rule of law in International Affairs (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
1998) 213. 
71 Weiler, above n 69, 559. 
72 See Kumm, above n 66, 908. 
73 See Kumm, above n 66, 918. 
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A number of States have voiced concern over the "increasing tendency of 
the Council in recent years to assume new and wider powers of legislation on 
behalf of the international community, with its resolutions binding on all 
States."74 Resolution 1373 (2001) is said to mark the beginning of the 
Security Council's "legislative phase". 75 Resolution 1540 (2004) is another 
example of Security Council "legislation".76 
What is different about these resolutions that give them the character of 
"legislation"? In order to answer this question it is necessary to identify the 
trademark features of "legislation". 
Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council has the power to 
create binding obligations on all Member States.77 In one sense of the word, the 
Security Council creates "law" whenever it acts under Chapter VII and imposes 
binding obligations on States. Indeed, calling on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, 
or on the Taliban to hand over Usama Bin Laden, are instances of the Security 
Council creating legal obligations. 
However, they are not examples of lawmaking in the popular sense of the 
word. The creation of such limited obligations, although having the force of law, 
cannot be said to be legislative in nature. The trademark of "legislation" is the 
prescription of general rules that are not limited in time.78 It is the presence of 
these features in the obligations created by Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 
(2004) that has caused the Security Council to be coined the term "legislator" 
when it adopted them. 
74 This statement was made by the representative of India in the Security Council: UNSC (22 
April 2004) Verbatim Record S/PY.4950, 23. 
75 Paul Szasz "The Security Council Starts Legislating" (2002) 96 Am J Int'l L 901. 
76 At the time of writing this paper, UNSC Resolution 1624 (14 September 2005) 
S/RES/1624(2005) was passed. This is the most recent example of Security Council legislation. 
See footnote 47 for a brief description of Resolution 1624 (2005). 
77 Article 25 of the UN Charter makes Security Council decisions binding on members. 
78 See Stefan Talmon "The Security Council as World Legislature" (2005) 99 Am J lnt' 1 L 175, 
176 where he states: "The hallmark of any international legislation is the general and abstract 
character of the obligations imposed." 
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Past practice of the Security Council has seen the imposition of binding 
obligations that are limited to a particular conflict or event and, even though not 
always explicitly limited in time, the obligations would naturally expire after the 
situation was resolved.79 Such actions are not legislative because "legislation" is 
typically not restricted in application to a particular event in time. 
In contrast, Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) tackle broad and 
abstract threats (international terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction to non-State actors) and hence the prescribed obligations are 
necessarily broad and not limited in time. For example, Resolution 1373 (2001) 
obliges States to criminalise the financing of terrorism and to freeze terrorists 
funds. Resolution 1540 (2004) obliges States to ensure that weapons of mass 
destruction do not get into the hands of non-State actors. 
The above summary of the practice of the CTC illustrates the legislative 
nature of the obligations. The CTC requires States to progressively increase their 
capacities to fight terrorism. The obligations do not relate to a particular terrorist 
that is to be criminalised or a country to be sanctioned. Rather, norms of general 
application are prescribed. 
The effect of saying that the Security Council has become a global 
legislator is to raise a number of legitimacy questions. In particular is the 
argument of some that the Security Council does not have the legal mandate to 
enact legislation. 
C Legality 
Since the end of the Cold War, the question of whether there are any legal 
limits on the power of the Security Council has received much attention. The 
debate over the legal competence of the Security Council to pass legislative 
resolutions such as Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) is the most recent 
chapter to this long running controversy. 
79 See Szasz, above n 75, 902. 
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I Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter 
(a) Summary 
The mandate of the Security Council is governed by its constituting treaty, 
the Charter. 80 Thus, the legal competence of the Security Council to legislate is 
to be assessed by the scope of the powers assigned to it under the Charter. 
Through Chapter VII, the Security Council has been given broad powers to 
achieve its primary purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 
These powers are indeed broad, but they are not unlimited.81 
Before the Security Council can utilise its powers under Chapter VII it 
must first determine under Article 39 the existence of a "threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression".82 The type of action, not involving the 
use of force, that can the Security Council can then oblige States to undertake is 
limited by Article 41. 
The Charter does not define the term "threat to the peace". This was 
done deliberately by the framers of the Charter to allow the Security Council to 
remain flexible in being able to respond to new types of threats as they emerge. 83 
There therefore exists no legal test to be met before a "threat to the peace" can be 
declared. The decision is rather a political one, involving many different 
considerations. Thus, the discretion under Article 39 is very broad. 84 
Although Article 39 was initially drafted to refer to threats created by 
inter-State conflicts, the Security Council has broadened this interpretation to 
80 See Prosecutor v Tadic (Appeal on Jurisdiction) (2 October 1995) IT-94-1-AR72 para 28 
(Appeals Chamber, ICTY). 
81 As the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
stated in Prosecutor v Tadic, above n 80, para 29, "neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter 
conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus ( unbound by law)". 
82 UN Charter, art 39. 
83 Bruno Simma (ed) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2 ed, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2002) 718-719. 
84 However, it is not unfettered. As the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia stated in Prosecutor v Tadic, above n 80, para 29, "the determination 
that there exists such a threat is not a totally unfettered discretion, as it has to remain, at the very 
least within the limits of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter." 
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include a vast array of different threats. 85 The concept of international peace and 
security has evolved. As the President of the Security Council stated in 1992: 86 
The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself 
ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability 
in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become 
threats to peace and security. 
The Security Council has also remained flexible in the range of measures 
available to it under Article 41 to address differing threats.87 The measures that 
are listed under article 41 are not exclusive.88 As the Appeals Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the ICTY held in Tadic, the listed measures 
"are merely illustrative examples which obviously do not exclude other measures. 
All the Article requires is that they do not involve 'the use of force'. It is a 
negative definition."89 By not exhaustively listing the measures available under 
Article 41, the framers of the Charter recognised the need to allow the Council to 
be flexible in its response to the many different threats that the world may face. 
(b) Global policeman 
The core role of the Security Council is that it is a global policeman. The 
Security Council was created to be numerically small in membership and 
composed of the "Great Powers" in order to ensure fast and effective action in 
times of crisis. 90 Although very wide powers are conferred on the Security 
Council under Chapter VII, the Charter conferred them on the condition that the 
85 Eric Rosand "The Security Council as "Global Legislator": Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?" 
(2005) 28 Fordham lnt'l Ll 542, 533 ["The Security Council as "Global Legislator": Ultra Vires 
or Ultra Innovative?"]. 
86 UNSC (31 January 1992) Presidential Statement S/23599. 
87 The Security Council has for example determined the boundary between two states (UNSC 
Resolution 687 (3 April 1991) S/Res/687(1991)), established a claims commission (UNSC 
Resolution 692 (20 May 1991) S/Res/692(1991)), two international criminal tribunals (UNSC 
Resolution 827 (25 May 1993) S/Res/897(1993) and UNSC Resolution 995 (8 November 1995) 
S/Res/995(1995)), and a committee to maintain a list of terrorists (UNSC Resolution 1267 (15 
October 1999) S/Res/ 1267(1999)). 
88 The measures available to the Security Council under Article 41 "include complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means 
of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations." 
89 See Prosecutor v Tadic, above n 80, para 35. 
90 Simrna, above n 83, 437. 
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Security Council would confine itself to short-term measures while the definitive 
settlement of a conflict was left to the parties or to the procedures under Chapter 
VI of the Charter.91 
Thus, despite the lack of express limitations in Articles 39 and 41, some 
argue that the Security Council's law making powers under Chapter VII do not 
extend to the creation of general rules. The argument is that the Security Council 
was designed to be a "global policeman" not a "world legislator".92 As such, the 
Security Council must remain situation-specific.93 It remains bound by the role 
of responding to particular international crises as they arise. Costa Rica made 
this argument in an open Security Council meeting on 19 October 2004, prior to 
the passing of Resolution 1540 (2004):94 
The Security Council is not a legislative body. Under the Charter, its 
mandate is confined to specific situations or specific disputes that endanger 
international peace and security. It can adopt binding measures only insofar 
as those measures are designed to resolve specific conflicts or deal with 
specific situations. The adoption of norms with general application is the 
prerogative of the international community as a whole, and is accomplished 
by negotiating treaties or through the formation of binding customary law. 
As stated above, the Security Council does have some law-making 
powers through the imposition of binding measures under Chapter VII. Thus, no 
true separation of powers was intended in the creation of the United Nations 
system.95 The separation of powers doctrine is a domestic concept that requires 
91 Simma, above n 83, 705. 
92 See Happold and Jose Alvarez "The UN's 'War' on Terrorism" (2003) 31 lnt'l J Legal Info 
238, 241. See also Happold "Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the 
United Nations" (2003) 16 UIJ 593, 600. See also the comments of various States in UNSC (22 
April 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4950. For example, the representative of Indonesia stated 
that "[a]ny far-reaching assumption of authority by the Security Council to enact global 
legislation is not consistent with the provisions of the Charter." 
93 See Georg Nolte "Limits of the Security Council's Powers" in Michael Byers (ed) The Role of 
!Aw in International Politics (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000) 315, 324. Georg Nolte 
submits the following: "Security Council action is linked, by definition, to concrete 
circumstances and the presumption is that it does not purport to influence the existing law beyond 
the scope of these circumstances." 
94 UNSC (19 October 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.5059 (Resumption 1), 20. 
95 See Simma, above n 83, 707. Bruno Simma comments that the Security Council exercises a 
number of different functions. To varying degrees it enforces the law, adjudicates, legislates, and 
administrates. 
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the executive, legislative and judicial powers of government to be split between 
two or more independent entities. The separation of powers is necessary for the 
avoidance of tyrannical government and for the furtherance of the rule of law. 
Importing these concepts into the United Nations system is problematic. 
The founding States did not intend to create a "constitution" as the term is 
understood for the internal organisation of States. 96 Indeed a separation of 
powers was not necessary because States did not confer on the United Nations 
organs the type of vast powers that a legislature or executive hold at the domestic 
level. The United Nations cannot be viewed as a State or a "super-State", 
whatever that expression might mean. 97 
The powers of the Security Council are therefore determined by the 
Charter, not by any domestic separation of powers concept. The question to be 
determined is whether the Charter allows the Security Council to use its law-
making powers for the creation of general rules not limited in time or whether it 
limits these powers to the creation of legal obligations in relation to a specific 
situation. The starting position seems to be that because the Charter primarily 
endowed the Security Council with a police function, it excludes the Security 
Council from having legislative powers.98 
However, in recent practice, the Security Council has exceeded the 
confines of acting as a policeman. In some cases the Security Council has taken 
measures amounting to the final settlement of disputes.99 For example, after the 
second Gulf War it established subsidiary organs for the final demarcation of the 
boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and for the determination of reparation 
due. 100 It has also created two international criminal tribunals to determine 
individual responsibility. 101 
96 See Sh Rosenne "General Course on Public International Law" (2001) 291 Recueil des Cours, 
421. 
97 See Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) 
[1949] ICJ Rep 174, 179. 
98 Sirnma, above n 83, 709. 
99 Sirnma, above n 83, 706. 
100 Sirnma, above n 83, 706. 
101 UNSC Resolution 827 (25 May 1993) S/R~s/897(1993) and UNSC Resolution 995 (8 
November 1995) S/Res/995(1995). 
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These final adjudicatory measures, while not remaining entirely free from 
criticism, seem to have been accepted by the majority of States. 102 Thus, it 
seems that the Security Council is not wholly constrained to police functions. 
However, just because the Security Council has taken measures for the final 
settlement of disputes does not mean that it has the power to create new legal 
rules of a general nature. The "legislative" practice of the Security Council prior 
to Resolution 1373 (2001) has been limited to creating obligations that relate to a 
specific situation and so end when the threat to the peace disappears. 
Despite this, it could be argued that Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 
(2004) can be viewed as simply another step forward in the Security Council's 
innovative practice. 103 Indeed, the notion of what is permissible under the 
Charter has evolved as the Council has been forced to grapple with new threats to 
international peace and security. 
Given the purpose of enabling the Security Council to remain flexible, it 
is arguable that the Security Council should have the power to impose 
obligations that are not "situation specific" in order to respond to threats such as 
terrorism that are global and not limited in time. 104 Although the Security 
Council has typically responded to specific instances of conflict or instability, the 
nature of terrorism is such that a more general approach is required. Perhaps it is 
unrealistic and dangerous to demand that the Security Council can only act on 
the multitude of specific terrorist threats as they arise rather than terrorism per se. 
This author does not take a position on whether Resolutions 1373 (2001) 
and 1540 (2004) were "ultra vires" or not. It is too early to make a determination 
of legality. While there is a strong argument against their legality in that they are 
contrary to the role the Charter assigned to the Security Council, what is 
102 Simma, above n 83, 706. 
103 "The Security Council as "Global Legislator": Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?", above n 85, 
570. 
104 The Charter of the United Nations is a treaty and so is to be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the Charter in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (26 May 1969) 
1155 UNTS 331, art 31(1). 
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generally considered to be permissible under the Charter has changed over the 
years. If the Security Council continues to legislate and this receives wide 
endorsement from States then perhaps Security Council legislation will be 
considered legal in certain circumstances. 
D Legitimacy 
1 Legality is not the only issue 
It is submitted that trying to define exactly what legal limits exist on the 
power of the Security Council is not substantially helpful. The nature of the 
Security Council's powers and the lack of any judicial review procedure mean 
that the actual vires of Security Council action is not a substantive check on its 
power. The only real check on Security Council power, apart from its own 
decision making procedures, is the willingness of States to implement its 
resolutions. It is for this reason that the fact that some Member States view the 
newly assumed "legislative" powers as being outside the Security Council's 
mandate is significant in itself. 
The narrow focus of assessing the precise legality of Security Council 
action and the ability of the International Court of Justice to review its decisions 
has often led to this arguably more important inquiry being overlooked. As the 
High Level Report stated, "[t]he effectiveness of the global collective security 
system, as with any other legal order, depends ultimately not only on the legality 
of decisions but also on the common perception of their legitimacy". 105 
An elaborate analysis of the various legitimacy issues that arise from the 
Security Council having legislative powers is therefore required in order to 
ascertain how the Security Council should act in the future if it wishes to remain 
effective. Firstly, the legitimate jurisdictional bounds of Security Council 
105 UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change "A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility" N59/565, para 204. See also India's statement in 
UNSC (22 April 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4950, 23: "The issue goes beyond a mere legal 
consideration of the Council's allocated powers under the Charter. The credibility and even 
respect that the Security Council can garner depend on its actions being the product of internal 
cohesion and universal acceptability." 
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legislation will be assessed. Secondly, the procedural concerns that arise from 
the Security Council's assumption of legislative powers, particularly the lack of 
democracy, will be examined. 
2 Jurisdictional Legitimacy 
There are a number of arguments to be made that law-making is not the 
proper domain of the Security Council. One is the objection that the obligations 
being created by these legislative resolutions are of the type that should only be 
created through treaty-making. Another argument against the Security Council 
legislating is that it does not have the ability to legislate clear rules. 
(a) Treaty-making 
The obligations created by these legislative resolutions are abstract and 
are therefore very wide-ranging in their scope. The creation of such obligations 
has traditionally been the domain of treaty-making. In other words, they are the 
result of careful planning and lengthy treaty negotiation. By deciding to become 
a signatory to a treaty, a State is consenting to the norms contained therein and 
agrees to do what is necessary to conform. 
In contrast, there is no "decision to be bound" to Security Council 
legislation. 106 Rather, a small unrepresentative body imposes new norms of 
international law with the effect that all States must make sweeping changes to 
their domestic legal and administrative systems in order to conform to the newly 
prescribed norms. The lack of consent to, or even participation in, the creation of 
these norms is a major argument against the legitimacy of such action, and thus 
bears on the willingness of States to implement. Switzerland's statement in the 
open Security Council debate preceding Resolution 1540 (2004) illustrates these 
jurisdictional concerns: 107 
106 Although States have agreed to be bound to Security Council decisions through Article 25 of 
the Charter, they do not have the opportunity to decide whether to consent to the particular 
obligations the Security Council imposes. 
107 UNSC (22 April 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4950, 28. 
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In principle, legislative obligations, such as those foreseen in the draft 
resolution under discussion, should be established through multilateral 
treaties, in whose elaboration all States can participate. It is acceptable for 
the Security Council to assume such a legislative role only in exceptional 
circumstances and in response to an urgent need. 
(b) When treaty-making does not suffice 
This author submits that if the Security Council is to continue to use its 
powers to legislate it should only do so in exceptional circumstances. Its 
legislative powers are limited by the fact that there must exist a threat to 
international peace and security of such a nature that requires the Security 
Council to prescribe general norms. This arguably requires that the threat must 
be such that the normal means of creating general norms (treaty adoption) are 
inadequate. 108 In other words, it requires the existence of an emergency. As 
Talmon submits, "Council legislation is always emergency legislation". 109 If the 
threat is not urgent, in that there is time for States to negotiate a treaty to deal 
with the matter, then there is no need for the Security Council to legislate. 
Arguably the Security Council has so far limited itself to prescribing 
general norms in emergency situations. Resolution 1373 (2001) was passed in 
the context of failings by States to conclude a comprehensive convention on 
terrorism. The threat of terrorism was evident and urgent steps needed to be 
taken by States to counter the threat. Although many of the obligations imposed 
by Resolution 1373 (2001) are found in the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, only four States had ratified this 
convention when Resolution 1373 (2001) was passed. 110 Resolution 1373 (2001) 
and the CTC conveyed the necessary message that action was needed. 
Resolution 1540 (2004) was also passed in the context of deficient 
international law that needed urgent attention. There was a gap in international 
108 See "The Security Council as "Global Legislator": Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?", above n 
85,556. 
109 Talmon, above n 78, 184. 
110 Szasz, above n 75, 903. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism (9 December 1999) 39 ILM 270. 
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law in that the current regime on non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction did not adequately deal with the threat of non-State actors getting 
their hands on such weapons. This threat was perceived as requiring urgent 
Security Council led action. 111 If there exists no such emergency, any attempt by 
the Security Council to legislate would probably result in States declining to 
implement the obligations created. 
(c) Inadequacies as a Legislator 
The notion that the Security Council should only prescribe general norms 
of international Jaw in rare circumstances is supported by its inadequacies as a 
legislator. The Security Council was clearly designed as an organ to police 
situations. It was specifically created to an unrepresentative body that would be 
able to act swiftly as particular threats arise. These virtues of the Council as a 
police officer are precisely its vices as a legislator. As well as being 
unrepresentative, the Security Council Jacks the resources and fact-finding 
capacity to be able to legislate adequately. 112 
Resolution 1373 (2001) is a good example of the inadequacy of Security 
Council legislation. Because it was not preceded by intense negotiation and 
debate, the obligations imposed Jack the clarity possessed by treaty-made 
obligations such as those contained in the various anti-terrorism conventions. 113 
In particular, those conventions define precisely the particular terrorist-related 
111 Pakistan thought differently (UNSC (22 April 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4950, 15): "There 
is no justification for the adoption of this resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter. The threat 
of WMD proliferation by non-State actors may be real, but it is not imminent. It is not a threat to 
peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the United Nations Charter." 112 Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations and the Institute for International Law 
and Justice of the New York University School of Law "The Security Council as World 
legislator?" (Panel Discussion, New York, 4 November 2004) <http://www.iilj.org> (last 
accessed 1 October 2005). 
113 See for example the definitions contained in the International Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorist Bombings (15 December 1997) 37 ILM 249, and the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (9 December 1999) 39 ILM 270. There were also a 
number of concerns over the clarity of the obligations created by Resolution 1540 (2004). For 
example, the representative of Switzerland stated in a Security Council meeting before the 
Resolution was adopted that "from the outset, there needs to be maximum clarity with respect to 
the scope of the obligations imposed on Member States. In this respect, Switzerland is of the 
opinion that a number of concepts contained in the draft resolution are not sufficiently precise." 
(UNSC (22 April 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4950, 28). 
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crime they are dealing with. In contrast, Resolution 1373 (2001) imposes 
obligations to prevent and suppress "terrorism" without defining what 
"terrorism" is, leaving the true scope of the Resolution unknown. 114 
It is submitted that this severely waters-down the obligations imposed on 
States. To legislate against terrorism, a response that is inherently not limited to 
a defined geographical area, without providing a definition of what acts 
constitute terrorism, necessarily creates loose obligations. Indeed, as stated 
above, States have largely been free to interpret the extent of their obligations 
under Resolution 1373 (2001) themselves, through the particular definition of 
terrorism they decide upon. 115 Although the Security Council and the CTC 
certainly succeeded (as illustrated above) in conveying an operational message of 
taking action to build capacities, there comes a point when there needs to be 
consensus as against whom the "war on terror" is targeting. 
(d) Deference to the General Assembly 
The main reason why the Security Council avoided the definitional issue 
was to bypass the debate that has stalled the United Nations from concluding a 
comprehensive convention on terrorism over the past few years. 116 What acts 
constitute terrorism is an issue that is of great controversy and one that States still 
remain divided on. 
Given this state of affairs, any attempt by the Security Council to legislate 
a definition of terrorism would be completely inappropriate. This highlights the 
inadequacy of the Security Council as a legislator. It is a key task of a legislator 
to define terms in order to provide certainty as to the scope of the prescribed 
obligations. However, if the Security Council wishes to remain legitimate, it 
114 The Counter-Terrorism Committee decided that it would not define "terrorism" (UNSC (18 
January 2002) Vertabim Record S/PV.4453, 5): "It is not going to define terrorism in a legal 
sense, although we will have a fair idea of what is blatant terrorism; where necessary, we will 
decide by consensus whether an act is terrorism." 
115 Syria for example has adopted a definition of terrorism "which clearly distinguishes between 
terrorism and legitimate struggle against foreign occupation" excluding groups fighting the Israeli 
occupation of Arab territories in Palestine from the application of the resolution (Talrr10n, above 
n 78, 189). 
116 See footnote 9 for information on the elaboration of a comprehensive convention on terrorism. 
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must avoid legislating on issues such as a definition of terrorism, which are 
properly the domain of all States to decide upon. 
One definitional issue on which States are divided is whether terrorism 
can apply to the acts of States in the same way that it applies to non-State actors. 
The most controversial issue however, is whether there should be a distinction 
between terrorism and the rights of peoples to combat foreign occupation. 
The speeches in Security Council's open meeting held on the 4th and 8th 
of October 2002 illustrate how divided States are on this issue. 117 At this 
meeting, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, representing 56 States, 
condemned "attempts to abolish the distinction between terrorism and the 
legitimate struggle of peoples against colonial domination or foreign 
occupation." 118 The African Union, representing 53 States, stated that it is 
"intolerable that populations struggling for their independence against the 
occupation of their national territories and against the denial of their human 
rights should be confused with terrorists." 119 
Arguably in response to the deadlock in the General Assembly over this 
issue, the Security Council attempted to define terrorism in Resolution 1566 
(2004). In paragraph three, the Security Council (acting under Chapter VII) 
recalled that terrorist acts "are under no circumstances justifiable by 
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or 
other similar nature" .120 In stating that terrorist acts cannot be justified by any 
117 UNSC (4 October 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4618; UNSC (4 October 2002) Verbatim 
Record S/PV.4618 (Resumption l); UNSC (8 October 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4618 
(Resumption 2). 
118 UNSC (4 October 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4618 (Resumption 1), 21. Of particular 
concern to the Arab Nations has been to exclude groups fighting the Israeli occupation of Arab 
territories in Palestine from the application of the Resolution. 
119 UNSC (8 October 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4618 (Resumption 2), 14. 
120 UNSC Resolution 1566 (8 October 2004) S/RES/1566(2004), para 3. The Security Council 
definition was limited to "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to 
cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of 
terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population 
or compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act, 
which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and 
protocols relating to terrorism." 
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cause, the Security Council attempted to override the debate over whether there 
can be a distinction between terrorism and the right to fight a foreign occupier. 
Numerous States made comments at an open Security Council meeting 
following Resolution 1566 (2004) criticising the Security Council's attempt to 
define terrorism. 121 Most comments evidenced a general concern about the 
Security Council abrogating the functions of the General Assembly. For 
example, the Algerian representative, after reiterating the need to distinguish 
terrorism from the legitimate struggle for liberation, stated: 122 
My delegation therefore believes that the criminal acts set out in paragraph 
3 of resolution 1566 (2004) should not be interpreted as a definition of 
terrorism. It is not up to the Security Council to legislate in that regard. 
That prerogative falls under the competence of the General Assembly. 
The representative of Switzerland noted that the definition does not 
"comply with the principle of legality in criminal law, which requires the clear 
and precise formulation of laws." 123 Because of such problems, the 
representative stated that "Switzerland hopes that in future the Council will fully 
respect the prerogatives of the Assembly with regard to developing and codifying 
international law."124 
The general view of States seems to be that paragraph three is not a legal 
definition of terrorism. Instead, it is a statement of policy that the targeting of 
innocents is never justifiable no matter what the cause. 125 While one may not be 
121 UNSC (19 October 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.5059. 
122 UNSC (19 October 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.5059, 17. The representative of Brazil also 
made the following statement (UNSC (19 October 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.5059, 11): 
"Defining terrorism falls under the functions and powers of the Assembly, as foreseen in the 
Charter." The representative of Costa Rica stated (UNSC (19 October 2004) Verbatim Record 
S/PV.5059, 20: "[W]e would like to highlight that the Security Council can not carry out a task of 
codifying international criminal law, because that task is incumbent on the international 
community as a whole." 
123 UNSC (19 October 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.5059, 25. The representative of Costa Rica 
also stated (UNSC (19 October 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.5059, 20): "[P]aragraph 3 does not 
meet the requirements, from a technical legal point of view, for functional definition of a crime." 
124 UNSC (19 October 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.5059, 25. 
125 The US Representative to the United Nations stated after the adoption of Resolution 1566 that 
"essentially paragraph 3 is not a law; it's a statement of policy" (United States Mission to the UN 
"Remarks by Ambassador John C. Danforth, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, after the 
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able to argue with this on moral grounds, it is submitted that the Security Council 
overstepped its boundaries in terms of what States perceive to be its jurisdictional 
limits. States have been trying to agree on a definition of terrorism for years. 
The sad truth remains that "one man's terrorist is another man' s freedom fighter" . 
To the extent that paragraph three attempts to legislate on this, it falls on deaf 
ears and will be of no effect. 
(e) Conclusion 
It can be concluded that the Security Council is clearly not an omnipotent 
legislator. Not only must there exist an emergency such that it is not appropriate 
to wait for the creation of a multilateral treaty, but the Security Council must also 
show deference to issues that the General Assembly is dealing with, such as the 
definition of terrorism. 
The Security Council must therefore only legislate to the extent that the 
obligations created receive wide support. The Security Council does not have 
the means or the consensus to decide upon controversial or complex issues. If 
the Security Council purports to do so, it will be abrogating from the function of 
the General Assembly as the forum to decide upon such issues. Furthermore, 
because the Security Council must avoid such issues, its legislation will usually 
only be provisional pending the final determination by all member States of the 
controversial issues. 126 
3 Procedural legitimacy 
Passage of Resolution 1566, at the Security Council Stakeout" (8 October 2004) Press Release). 
See also the following statement of the representative Brazil made in the Security Council 
meeting that followed Resolution 1566 (UNSC (19 October 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.5059, 
11): "In our view, resolution 1566 (2004) reflects compromise language that contains a clear 
important political message, but it is not an attempt to define the concept of terrorism." The 
representative of Costa Rica stated (UNSC (19 October 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.5059, 20): 
"We understand that these two paragraphs are political statements, and not legal enactments". 126 Resolution 1540 (2004) was seen by many as an interim measure pending a more 
comprehensive convention on the matter. It was legitimate for the Security Council to legislate 
as immediate steps needed to be taken. However, as the representative of New Zealand stated 
(UNSC (22 April 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4950, 21): "In New Zealand's view, this draft 
resolution represents a critical stopgap measure rather than an optimal solution. These are 
complex issues, and they must be addressed comprehensively and effectively." 
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Some would argue that the legitimacy of obligations imposed by the 
Security Council cannot be questioned given that States consented to be bound 
by Security Council decisions. Through Article 25 of the Charter, States agreed 
that they would become bound by obligations imposed by the Security Council 
when it acted under Chapter VII, and furthermore, it was agreed that such 
obligations would take precedence over existing treaty obligations. 127 
However, it is submitted that little legitimating value can put on this 
consent as the Security Council increasingly engages in an expansive 
f . 128 interpretation o its powers. It was never envisaged that States were 
consenting away their fundamental ability to choose their obligations under 
international law. 
More is required to legitimise the Security Council's legislative powers 
than a mere Article 25 argument. In particular, the concerns arising from a lack 
of democracy need to be addressed. There is a clear democratic deficit in the 
Security Council. It is both unrepresentative and unaccountable. If an 
international organisation were to have legislative power, one would think that 
the United Nations General Assembly would most suit that role. 
This writer is well aware of the need to be careful to not blindly apply 
domestic concepts and processes to international contexts. Democracy is a form 
of domestic government that legitimises the power of governance. Just because 
an international institution such as the Security Council has a power of 
governance, it does not mean that domestic forms of democracy are the only 
instrument for legitimising that power. 129 
127 UN Charter, Art 103. 
128 See Kumm, above n 66,914. 
129 See Weiler, above n 69, 561. Weiler submits that it is misguided to simply ask whether 
international law making should be democratic given the radically varied ways and means of 
international norm setting and law making. A contextual analysis is required. Furthermore, 
"given that the vocabulary of democracy is rooted in notions of demos, nation and state, there is 
no conceptual template from the traditional array of democratic theories one can employ to meet 
the challenge ... What is required is both a rethinking of the very building blocks of democracy to 
see how these may or may not be employed in an international system which is neither State nor 
Nation and to search for alternative legitimating devices which would make up for the non 
applicability of some of the classical institutions of democracy where that is not possible." 
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Indeed it would be ludicrous to try to legitimise international law making 
through a simplistic application of a majority rules principle. 13° Furthermore, 
electoral accountability is not the right test to apply. 131 However, this does not 
mean that some of the core democratic principles cannot be applied to analyse 
the procedural legitimacy of the Security Council's legislative activities. In 
particular, the notions of participation, transparency, and some form of 
accountability are certainly applicable. 132 
In terms of participation, views that the Security Council is 
unrepresentative have been compounded in light of the Security Council's 
assumption of legislative powers. The case for reform of the membership of the 
Security Council is more urgent in light of recent legislative activity. 
Furthermore, as Security Council legislation affects the interests of all 
States, the legitimacy of such legislation would increase if the Security Council 
allowed the views of the wider UN membership to be heard and debated. 133 As 
the New Zealand representative declared to the Security Council prior to 
Resolution 1540 being passed: 134 
[T]he draft resolution will not succeed in its aim without the support and 
acceptance of Member States. Such acceptance requires the Council to dispel 
any impression of negotiations behind closed doors or that a small group of 
States is drafting laws for the broader membership without the opportunity for 
all Member States to express their views. 
This statement was made during an open debate held by the Security 
Council that involved 51 States. It is the view of this author that this practice of 
open participation should continue whenever the Security Council contemplates 
130 Weiler, above n 69, 56I. 
131 Kumm, above n 66,926. 
132 See Kumm, above n 66, 926. 
133 Article 31 of the United Nations Charter provides that "(a]ny member of the United Nations 
which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of 
any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests 
of that Member are specially affected." 
134 UNSC (22 April 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4950, 2I. 
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passing legislation. As the Philippines representative stated, "[t]hose who are 
bound should be heard."135 
Not only should States be allowed to participate, but the Security Council 
should be responsive to their concerns. Although the members of the Security 
Council cannot be held accountable in the way members of a legislature are in a 
democracy, it is submitted that the willingness of States to comply is the 
accountability mechanism here. Cooperation not coercion is required for 
Security Council legislation to be effective. This is essential given the nature of 
the obligations being created. Thus, if the Security Council wishes to ensure 
effective implementation of its legislation, it must be responsive to the concerns 
of States. 
E Actual Efficacy of the Security Council's Action 
While it is important to focus debate on what procedural mechanisms are 
in place to ensure the legitimacy of Security Council action, this should not 
overshadow the essential inquiry of how effective the particular Security Council 
actions are in maintaining international peace and security. Given that the 
primary goal of the Security Council is the maintenance of international peace 
and security, the Security Council must be judged, to a very large extent, by the 
actual effectiveness of its actions. It is too soon to judge how successful 
Resolution 1540 (2004) has been in achieving its goal. This is not the case with 
Resolution 1373 (2001). 
Simply put, Resolution 1373 (2001) has been very successful in raising 
the general ability of States to prevent and suppress terrorism. The Resolution 
did more than merely urge States to increase their efforts against terrorism. It 
obliged States to take numerous concrete steps to increase their legislative and 
135 UNSC (22 April 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4950, 2. See also the following statement of 
the representative of Liechtenstein (UNSC (22 April 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4950 
(Resumption 1), 21): "Open debates of the Security Council are an important means of enabling 
the Council to hear the view of other Member States and thus to truly act on their behalf, as 
foreseen in the Charter of the United Nations. We believe that that practice is of particular 
importance when the Council tackles, on an exceptional basis, issues in the area of standard-
setting and lawmaking, as is the case with the subject matter before us today." 
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enforcement capabilities. As a result, practical changes can be seen to have 
occurred. Despite the problem outlined above that States have a vast discretion 
in the implementation of the Resolution, the vast majority of States have taken 
the obligations very seriously with the result that global capabilities have 
certainly increased. 
Much of this success can be attributed to the work of the CTC. The CTC 
cannot be judged by the number of terrorists arrested or the number of attacks 
avoided. As illustrated in the above synopsis of the CTC's work, the CTC is not 
a law enforcement agency. Nor does it coordinate States' enforcement activities 
against specific threats. So it does not have any operational achievements in that 
sense to report. 136 Rather the CTC plays the unique role of seeking to raise 
average State performance against terrorism across the globe. 
Thus, although the CTC is certainly an innovation in the practice of the 
Security Council, it has not replaced States as the primary actors in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. It is still very much a State-
centred system. Resolution 1373 (2001) imposed the obligations to prevent and 
suppress terrorism on States. The CTC seeks to further State performance of 
these obligations. 
Although the CTC faces numerous challenges, as highlighted above in 
the synopsis of its work, this does not detract away from the fact that it has 
largely been successful in stimulating counter-terrorism activity on the part of 
States. The dialogue the CTC has engaged in has focussed States' efforts on 
what practical measures need be taken to ensure their compliance with 
Resolution 1373. 
These successes suggest that the creation of general legal rules by the 
Security Council can be an effective tool to use to counter threats that are global 
and not situation-specific. Thus, it is submitted that where appropriate, the 
Security Council should not shy away from passing legislation. The failure of all 
136 UNSC (27 June 2002) Verbatim Record S/PV.4561, 3. 
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States to agree on a particular course of action in a timely manner should not 
prevent immediate action from being taken when the threat so demands. 
However, it would be wise for the Security Council to take account of the issues 
discussed above in order to ensure that when it does legislation, it does so in a 
legitimate fashion. 
IV SANCTIONING NON-STATE ACTORS 
The Security Council has not only sought to increase States' capacities to 
prevent and suppress terrorism, it has also taken a more direct approach against 
the threat of terrorism through the use of sanctions. Although a traditional tool in 
its armoury, the sanctions regime the Security Council has applied against the 
Taliban and Al-Qaida is unlike any other. The following section seeks to outline 
the sanctions regime, its implementation and the various problems with the 
regime in order to provide a base for an analysis of due process issues and to 
analyse the efficacy of the sanctions. 
A The Taliban and Al-Qaida Sanctions Regime and the 1267 Committee 
The current Taliban and Al-Qaida sanctions regime originated in 
Resolution 1267 (1999). 137 Through this Resolution, the Security Council sought 
to provide an international response to the threat posed by Usama bin Laden and 
his Al-Qaida organisation. 138 The Resolution followed the indictment by the 
United States of Usama bin Laden and his associates for the 1998 bombings of 
United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Tanzania, and the failure of the 
Taliban to deny Al-Qaida a safe haven in Afghanistan. 139 The Security Council, 
accustomed to dealing with States, decided to confront the Al-Qaida threat by 
targeting the Taliban. 140 The resolution required, inter alia, all Member States to 
137 UNSC Resolution 1267 (15 October 1999) S/RES/1267(1999). 
138 This paper takes the spelling of "Usama bin Laden" as is commonly used in the Security 
Council. This writer is aware that it is often spelt "Osama bin Laden". 
139 See the preamble of UNSC Resolution 1267 (15 October 1999) S/RES/1267(1999). 
140 UNSC 1267 Committee "First Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring 
Team appointed pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) concerning AI-Qaida and the Taliban and 
associated individuals and entities" (25 August 2004) S/2004/679, 5 ["First Report of the 
Monitoring Team"] 
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freeze the financial resources of the Taliban. A Committee of the Security 
Council (1267 Committee), consisting of all the members of the Council was 
created to monitor State implementation of the resolution and to report violations 
f th , · 141 o e sanctions regime. 
Following the failure of the Taliban to hand over Usama bin Laden and 
the impunity with which Al-Qaida continued to train and plan operations in 
Afghanistan, the Security Council decided to strengthen the sanctions regime. 142 
Resolution 1333 (2000) imposed an arms embargo and a travel ban on the 
Taliban. The more significant step was to extend the asset freeze to Usama bin 
Laden, Al-Qaida and their associates. 143 The 1267 Committee was charged with 
maintaining an updated list of those individuals and entities based on information 
provided by States and regional organisations. 144 The resolution placed a twelve 
month time limit on the sanctions. 145 
Following September 11 and the United States' attacks on Afghanistan, 
resolution 1390 (2002) was passed, which now forms the basis for today's 
sanction regime. 146 The sanctions consist of an asset freeze, a travel ban, and an 
arms embargo. Those targeted are Usama bin Laden, members of Al-Qaida and 
the Taliban, and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated 
with them as referred to in the list maintained by the 1267 Committee. 147 These 
persons and entities are targeted wherever they are situated, not just within the 
Afghanistan territory. The sanctions regime is reviewed periodically for the 
purposes of improvement but it is otherwise permanent. 148 
141 UNSC Resolution 1267 (15 October 1999) S/RES/1267(1999), para 6. 
142 This was done by UNSC Resolution 1333 (19 December 2000) S/RES/1333(2000). See the 
comments of the representative of the United States in UNSC (19 December 2000) Verbatim 
Record S/PV. 4251 , 7: "The Taliban cannot continue to flout the will of the international 
community and support and shelter terrorists without repercussions. As long as the Taliban 
leadership continues to harbour terrorists, in particular Usama bin Laden, and to promote 
terrorism, it remains a threat to international peace and security". 
143 UNSC Resolution 1333 (19 December 2000) S/RES/1333(2000), para 8(c). 
144 UNSC Resolution 1333 (19 December 2000) S/RES/1333(2000), para 8(c). 
145 UNSC Resolution 1333 (19 December 2000) S/RES/1333(2000), para 23. 146 UNSC Resolution 1390 (28 January 2002) S/RES/1390(2002). 
147 UNSC Resolution 1390 (28 January 2002) S/RES/1390(2002), para 2. 
148 Paragraph 3 of resolution 1390 provides for the sanctions to be reviewed in twelve months at 
which time the Council "will either allow these measures to continue or decide to improve them". 
The effect is that the sanctions will continue indefinitely until the Security Council decides to 
withdraw them. 
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It should be noted that the sanctions regime does not apply to terrorists 
that are not associated with Al-Qaida or the Taliban. Many countries maintain 
their own list of terrorists that include groups that may not be on the 1267 
Committee's list, such as the Palestinian group Hamas. 149 Indeed, Resolution 
1373 (2001) extends the obligation to freeze terrorists' assets beyond merely 
those on the 1267 Committee's list. 150 
Following the Beslan terrorist attacks in 2004, Russia tabled a draft 
resolution before the Security Council that would have established a new list of 
terror subjects, targeting those not on the 1267 Committee' s list. Russia was 
motivated largely by its desire to extend sanctions to Chechan rebels. The 
resolution was not passed in its submitted form, but Resolution 1566 (2004) did 
establish a working group to make recommendations to the Security Council on 
what practical measures should be imposed upon terrorists other than Al-Qaida 
and the Taliban. 
B The List of Al-Qaida and Taliban Members and Their Associates 
The foundation of the sanctions regime is the list maintained by the 1267 
Committee. This list represents the front line of the United Nations efforts 
against international terrorism. The goal is to ensure the listed individuals and 
entities do not have the means to organise and carry out terrorist attacks. Every 
Member State is under an obligation to "freeze without delay the funds and other 
financial assets or economic resources" of the people and entities on that list. 151 
Further, Member States must prevent those on the list from travelling through 
their territory and from acquiring arms. 
149 For example, the European Union maintains a list that is annexed to Common Position (EEC) 
2001/931/CFSC [2001] OJ L 344. The list is drawn up on the basis of investigations carried out 
by the competent judicial and police authorities in the European Union Member States. The list 
includes ET A (Basque Fatherland and Liberty), the IRA (Irish Republican Army), the terrorist 
wing of Hamas, and other revolutionary activist groups, as well as the names of individuals 
belonging to such groups. These groups are generally not associated with Al-Qaida or the 
Taliban and so do not appear on the 1267 Committee's list. 
150 UNSC Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001) S/RES/1373(2001), para l(c). 
151 UNSC Resolution 1390 (28 January 2002) S/RES/1390(2002), para 2(a). 
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It is States that implement the sanctions against those targeted, and it is 
also States who are responsible for identifying those who are to be targeted. 
Although the 1267 Committee controls who goes on the list, it relies on the 
submission of names by States of known Al-Qaida and Taliban members and 
their associates. 
Any State may propose a name for addition to the list. Proposed 
additions must "include identifying information and background information, to 
the greatest extent possible, that demonstrates the individual(s)' and/or 
entity(ies)' association with Usama bin Laden or with members of the Al-Qaida 
organisation and/or the Taliban". 152 The Chairman of the Committee will 
circulate to all members of the Committee the proposed addition upon which the 
members have two working days to object before the addition will be deemed 
adopted.153 Because the Committee works by consensus, one fervent objector 
can stop the addition of a name to the list.154 
There is no evidentiary standard required for the addition of a name to the 
list. Particularly during the Committee's initial period of work, the addition of 
names to the list was largely based on political trust, often made without 
explanations of the link between the named individual or entity and Al-Qaida and 
the Taliban. 155 
C Monitoring Compliance 
152 UNSC Resolution 1526 (30 January 2004) S/RES/1526(2004), para 17. Prior to resolution 
1526, there was no such requirement and additions were made, especially in the early post-
September l l days, without disclosing the intelligence that demonstrated the link with Al-Qaida 
or the Taliban, and often with little accompanying identifying information. 
153 This is known as the "no objection procedure". See UNSC 1267 Committee "Guidelines of the 
Committee for the Conduct of its Work" (7 November 2002, amended on 10 April 2003), para 
9(b) <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/l267Template.htm> (last accessed 22 August 
2005). 
154 See UNSC 1267 Committee "Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work" (7 
November 2002, amended on lO April 2003), para 9(a) 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/l267Template.htm> (last accessed 22 August 2005). 
155 Eric Rosand "The Security Council's Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of Al Qaeda/ 
Taliban Sanctions" 98 Am J lnt'l L 745, 748 ["The Security Council's Efforts to Monitor the 
Implementation of Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions"]. 
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In order to assist the 1267 Committee in its monitoring function, the 
Security Council decided to establish, through resolution 1363 (2001), a 
Monitoring Group of experts. 156 This group produced reports to the Committee 
based on its review of the reports of Member States and information gathered 
from visits to selected countries. These reports contain invaluable findings on 
the level to which the sanctions have been implemented and the substantive 
effect they are having on the Al-Qaida and Taliban networks. 157 The Monitoring 
Group was eventually replaced by the Analytical Support and Sanctions 
Monitoring Team (the "Monitoring Team") with the passing of resolution 1526 
(2004). 158 
The means by which the 1267 Committee has monitored State 
compliance with the sanctions regime is through reports submitted by Member 
States. 159 The Security Council has, through various resolutions, requested 
reports to be made to the 1267 Committee. 160 In particular, Resolution 1455 
(2003) required a comprehensive review to be undertaken, requiring all States to 
submit a report on the steps taken to implement the sanctions, on all related 
investigations and enforcement actions, and including a comprehensive summary 
of frozen assets of listed individuals and entities within their territories. 161 
156 UNSC Resolution 1363 (30 July 2001) S/RES/1363(2001). 
157 Not all were happy with the workings of the Monitoring Group. Some States were concerned 
with the way the Monitoring Group operated and its Jack of sensitivity. See for example the 
comments of the representatives of Liechtenstein and Ireland in UNSC (12 January 2004) 
Verbatim Record S/PV.4892. The Leichtenstein representative stated: "The Liechtenstein 
authorities have cooperated in a proactive and constructive manner with the Group in order to 
facilitate its task, and have provided it with important information. However, we believe that 
such cooperation should be reciprocated by the Monitoring Group. The Group's case-based 
investigative work has not always been conducted with a view to ensuring enhanced 
implementation of the measures imposed by the Council. Furthermore, we noted once again that 
the report prepared by the Group was leaked to the press before it was received by the States 
concerned. We expect that that situation will not reoccur in the future." See also "The Security 
Council's Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions", above n 155, 
754-755. 
158 UNSC Resolution 1526 (30 January 2004) S/RES/1526(2004), para 6. 
159 The Committee has conducted some visits to States in order to gain a further understanding of 
the level of implementation but the main source of information continues to be State reports. 
160 See UNSC Resolution 1333 (19 December 2000) S/RES/1333(2000), para 20; UNSC 
Resolution 1390 (28 January 2002) S/RES/1390(2002), para 6; UNSC Resolution 1526 (30 
January 2004) S/RES/1526(2004), para 21; UNSC Resolution 1455 (17 January 2003) 
S/RES/1455, para 6; UNSC Resolution 1617 (29 July 2005) S/RES/1617(2005), para 10. 
161 UNSC Resolution 1455 (17 January 2003) S/RES/1455(2003), para 6. 
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The level of reporting by Member States to the 1267 Committee has 
generally been poor. As at 30 October 2003, six and a half months after the 
required submission date for Resolution 1455 reports, only 83 States had 
submitted a report (108 not submitted). 162 A year later, 60 States had still not 
submitted a report. 163 
The failure of so many States to report has been of serious concern. The 
Chairman of the 1267 Committee stated that the inadequate reporting has 
"seriously hampered the Committee in accomplishing its task" of monitoring 
States' implementation of the sanctions regime. 164 Given that many States have 
not reported, it is hard to say whether those States are implementing the regime. 
However, the Monitoring Team has made it clear that the lack of a report from a 
State doesn't necessarily denote any lack of will to produce one or any lack of 
commitment to the international effort against Al-Qaida and the Taliban. 165 
An important reason for not reporting appears to be lack of capacity to 
produce the required reports. 166 There also seems to be an impression that some 
States do not need to report to the 1267 Committee because they have reported 
their counterterrorism efforts to the CTC or because the Al-Qaida and Taliban 
threat is of no national concern to them. 167 The Security Council has stressed the 
importance of reporting to each committee. 168 
D Problems with the Sanctions 
Over the years, the 1267 Committee and its monitoring experts have 
undertaken the very important task of identifying how the sanctions regime can 
162 UNSC 1267 Committee "Second report of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to 
resolution 1363 (2001) and extended by resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003), on sanctions 
against Al-Qaida, the Taliban and individuals and entities associated with them" (2 December 
2003) S/2003/1070, 36 ["Second Report of the Monitoring Group"]. 
163 "Second Report of the Monitoring Group", above n 162, 14. 
164 UNSC (12 January 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4892, 6. 
165 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 18. 
166 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 18. 
167 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 18. 
168 UNSC Resolution 1526 (30 January 2004) S/RES/1526(2004), paras 22 and 23 requested all 
States that had not submitted 1455 reports to explain in writing their reasons for non-reporting 
and requested the 1267 Committee to circulate a list of those States that had not reported. 
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be continually improved. Member States have contributed to this process by 
identifying in their reports the . problems they have had in implementing the 
regime. While the 1267 Committee and the Security Council have generally 
been flexible in their response, a number of concerns remain, particularly relating 
to listing and delisting procedures. 
1 The 1267 Committee's list 
(a) Quality of the list 
Perhaps the most consistently voiced concern has been to do with the 
quality of the list of designated individuals and entities. Many States have 
reported that the names listed contain insufficient identifiers to allow proper 
enforcement of the sanctions. 169 For example, many entries on the list lack basic 
identifiers such as date of birth, nationality, known location and passport 
information. Without such identifying information, enforcement of the sanctions 
by financial institutions and border authorities is next to impossible. 170 
Furthermore, problems have occurred with the misspelling of names and 
inaccuracies in translation. 171 
In response to these concerns, the Monitoring Team has made a concerted 
effort to obtain additional information from States on the names they have 
submitted. 172 In addition, Resolution 1526 (2004) has called upon all States to 
169 See UNSC 1267 Committee "Second Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions 
Monitoring Team appointed pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the 
Taliban and associated individuals and entities" S/2005/83, 12 ["Second Report of the 
Monitoring Team"]; See also UNSC (12 January 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4892, 4; See also 
"Second Report of the Monitoring Group", above n 162, 67. 
170 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 11. The difficulty in positively 
identifying listed individuals was evident from many States 1455 reports. In Liechtenstein's 
1455 report, it reported that it is often not able to freeze the accounts of a given individual 
without having a date of birth. It further reported that some of the aliases listed give rise to 
confusion. Portugal's 1455 report gave a telling example: "In one case one name on the list 
corresponded to around 50 identical names in the database of a banking institution." See 
"Second Report of the Monitoring Group", above n 162, 67. 
171 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 11. 
172 "Second Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 169, 12. 
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include identifying information when submitting names to the 1267 
Committee. 173 
(b) Size of the list 
Another problem with the list is its small size. As of 1 October 2005, 
there are 448 names on the list. 174 To put this in perspective, the Monitoring 
Group reported in December 2003 that some 4000 individuals have been arrested 
or detained around the world on the basis of their links with Al-Qaida. 175 It 
seems as though many States have not been submitting names to the Committee. 
The 1267 Committee does not believe that the list needs to be an 
exhaustive compendium of all known Al-Qaida members and associates. 176 
However, it is clear that further work needs to be done to make the list more 
representative of the threat the world faces from Al-Qaida. In this respect, the 
Committee and its Monitoring Team have strongly encouraged more States to 
submit names to the list. 177 The Security Council has also stressed the 
importance of submitting names "unless to do so would compromise 
investigations or enforcement actions." 178 
Several reasons have been put forward for the reluctance of States to 
submit names. Some States may be reluctant to submit names because of their 
concerns that the regime breaches individuals' fundamental rights of due 
process. 179 States have also expressed concern over the harshness of the asset 
freeze for those on the list and their families. The Security Council responded to 
this latter issue by adopting Resolution 1452 (2002) which allows funds to be 
173 UNSC Resolution 1526 (30 January 2004) S/RES/1526(2004), para 17. 
174 UNSC 1267 Committee "New Consolidated List" 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/l267Template.htm> (last accessed 1 October 2005). 
175 "Second Report of the Monitoring Group", above n 162, 9. 
176 "Second Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 169, 12. 
177 As of 25 August 2004, only twenty one States had submitted names for inclusion on the List. 
See "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 10. 
178 See UNSC Resolution 1455 (17 January 2003) S/RES/1455(2003), para 4. See also UNSC 
Resolution 1526 (30 January 2004) S/RES/1526(2004), para 16. 
179 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 11. 
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accessed that are "necessary for basic expenses". 180 Problems over who exactly 
is "associated with" Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban has been 
suggested as another reason for States not submitting names. 181 The Security 
Council sought to rectify this situation by passing Resolution 1617 (2005) which 
defines more clearly what connection is required for the "associated with" test to 
be met. 182 
2 The asset freeze 
According to the Monitoring Team's report in February 2005, "[t]he asset 
freeze is perhaps the most implemented of the sanctions on a global scale, and it 
may constitute the most effective mechanism to prevent large-scale terrorist 
operations." 183 A considerable effort has been made by the international 
community to deny terrorists access to funds. It now seems as though all but 
three Member States have a legal framework in place for freezing the assets of 
Al-Qaida, the Taliban and their associates. 184 
However, one shortcoming is that in many countries there is apparently 
still a need to present sufficient evidence to judicial authorities as a prerequisite 
of the freezing of assets. 185 These requirements have caused concern to the 1267 
Committee because they entail delays and are not as effective as executive-
authorised freezes. The Chairman of the Committee has thus made it clear that 
"such systems are not in conformity with Member States' obligations". 186 
180 UNSC Resolution 1452 (20 December 2002) S/RES/1452(2002), para l. This allowance only 
applies after the relevant State(s) has notified the 1267 Committee of its intention to authorise 
access to such funds and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within 48 hours 
of such notification. Access to funds are also allowed for "extraordinary expenses, provided that 
such determination has been notified by the relevant State(s) to the Committee and has been 
afiproved by the Committee." 
1 1 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 10. 
182 UNSC Resolution 1617 (29 July 2005) S/RES/1617(2005). See below for the definition of 
"associated" and an analysis of the scope of the sanctions. 
183 "Second Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 169, 5. 
184 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 12. 
185 UNSC 1267 Committee "Third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring 
Team appointed pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and 
associated individuals and entities" (9 September 2005) S/2005/572, 17 ["Third Report of the 
Monitoring Team"] 
186 UNSC (20 July 2005) Verbatim Record S/PV.5229, 6. 
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As a result of the sanctions, Al-Qaida's funding has decreased 
significantly. 187 Generally, the formal banking sector has responded well with 
the introduction of stricter "know your customer" rules, extensive circulation of 
the 1267 Committee's list, and tightening up of procedures. 188 However, much 
still needs to be done to extend these measures to banks and other financial 
institutions in States that lack the resources to implement effective controls. 189 
The 1267 Committee has always been conscious of the problems of 
imposing financial measures against a threat that is characterised by clandestine 
operations. Indeed the Committee currently believes that Al-Qaida, the Taliban 
and their associates readily use alternative means of holding and moving assets 
outside of the formal financial sector. 190 The Committee has therefore stressed 
the need for Member States to regulate the use of alternative remittance systems 
and the cross-border movement of hard cash. 191 
3 The travel ban 
The travel ban has had little if any effect on the activities of the Taliban 
and Al-Qaida. 192 Not one country has reported that it has prevented a person on 
the list from travelling. 193 There are numerous reasons for this poor result. The 
lack of detail in many entries on the list makes it difficult for border officials to 
identify that any particular traveller is subject to the ban. 194 The lack of effective 
border controls and failure to incorporate the list into them also undermines the 
effectiveness of the ban. Further, the ability of terrorists to use stolen and altered 
travel documents is a major problem. 195 
187 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 12. 
188 "Second Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 169, 20. The Monitoring Team has noted 
that although registered banks have generally been given up-to-date versions of the Consolidated 
List, the List is having limited distribution to financial institutions other than banks. See "First 
Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 13. 
189 See "Second Report of the Monitoring Group", above n 162, 24. 
190 "Second Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 169, 20. 
191 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 14; "Second Report of the Monitoring 
Team", above n 169, 21-26. 
192 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 16. 
193 "Second Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 169, 39. 
194 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 16. 
195 "Second Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 169, 40. 
50 
4 The arms embargo 
The arms embargo has reportedly been the hardest of the sanctions to 
implement. 196 This is because preventing Al-Qaida, the Taliban and their 
associates from acquiring arms basically requires States to curb the flow of arms 
to non-State actors across the globe. 197 Furthermore, the difficulties in 
preventing these terrorists from obtaining arms is compounded by the fact that 
one of the hallmarks of Al-Qaida is the simplicity of its methodology. 198 For 
example, the Madrid bombers used mining explosives and cell phones as 
detonators rather than military products. 199 
V LEGITIMACY OF THE 1267 SANCTIONS 
While it is generally considered appropriate for the Security Council to 
target non-State actors with sanctions, there are a number of issues with the Al-
Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime that impinge on its perceived legitimacy. 
Firstly, there are some concerns over the scope of the sanctions. The definition 
of "associated with" is very wide and has the potential to catch those who 
unknowingly support Al-Qaida or the Taliban. Secondly, there are major issues 
relating to the lack of due process protections in the maintenance of the list. 
A Scope of the Sanctions Regime 
The Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime represents a major innovation 
in the practice of the Security Council. It is not the first time that non-State 
actors have posed a threat to international peace and security. Nor is it the first 
time the Security Council has imposed sanctions against non-State actors. 200 
However, when it has done so, the sanctions have been limited to a particular 
rebel group confined to a particular geographical area. 
196 UNSC (12 January 2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4892, 5. 
197 "Second Report of the Monitoring Group", above n 162, 28. 
198 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 15. 
199 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 15. 
200 In the case of the UNIT A held areas of Angola, the Security Council imposed "smart" 
sanctions against the leadership of UNIT A, including an asset freeze wherever their assets were 
situated (Resolution 1173). In the case of Cambodia, the Security Council imposed limited 
sanctions against the PDK (also known as the Khmer Rouge) by Resolution 792. 
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The Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime is much more ambitious than 
this. The sanctions regime does not just target the well-known leadership of 
these groups, nor is it designed to target a particular geographical area. The 
sanctions apply broadly to anyone who is "associated with" these groups, 
wherever in the world they are situated. 
As stated above, the Security Council defined in Resolution 1617 (2005) 
what connection is required for the "associated with" test to be met.201 The acts 
or activities which indicate the required connection include:202 
- participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or 
perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the 
name of, on behalf of, or in support of; 
- supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materials to; 
- recruiting for; or 
- otherwise supporting acts or activities of; 
Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, or any cell, affiliate, splinter 
group or derivative thereof. 
This definition is clearly quite broad. It follows from the Monitoring 
Team's recommendation for States to interpret "associated with" broadly in order 
to ensure that terrorist suspects do not fall between the cracks.203 The reference 
to "any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof' recognises the 
changed nature of the Al-Qaida threat. Today's threat is more readily 
characterised by a global network rather than an organisation with a structure and 
hierarchy that was once Al-Qaida prior to the expulsion of the Taliban from 
power in Afghanistan.204 The threat includes "franchise" or "start-up" groups 
201 UNSC Resolution 1617 (29 July 2005) S/RES/1617(2005). 
202 UNSC Resolution 1617 (29 July 2005) S/RES/1617(2005) para 2. 
203 "Second Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 169, 11. The Monitoring Team 
recommended that if in doubt, States should submit the name, leaving it up to the Committee to 
ensure that each case falls within the scope of the sanctions programme. 
204 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 6. 
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that have little or no direct contract with the central leadership but who share the 
same political objectives and religious beliefs.205 
Thus, groups that adopt the Al-Qaida philosophy may find themselves 
sanctioned even though they may never have had any contact with the old Al-
Qaida organisation that trained in Afghanistan. While this is justifiable, some 
States have been concerned that the definition doesn't include any knowledge 
and intent elements. 206 Therefore, those who unknowingly and inadvertently 
support terrorists may find themselves blacklisted and sanctioned. 
B Due Process Concerns 
Perhaps the most innovative and controversial aspect of the sanctions is 
that those to be targeted are decided upon by a committee of the Security Council. 
Because the Security Council targeted such an ambiguous threat, it was 
necessary to create a process whereby the particular individuals and entities to be 
targeted could be identified. That process is the maintenance of the list by the 
1267 Committee. 
205 See "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 7. See also the comments of the 
Chairman of the 1267 Committee in UNSC (20 July 2005) Verbatim Record S/PV.5229, 4-5: 
"There can be no doubt that the threat posed by Al-Qaida is radically different from the threat it 
posed when this sanctions regime was fust imposed. It is believed that Al-Qaida terrorism now 
comprises three separate but interlinked groups: first is the old leadership, whose names are 
known to everyone; second are the fighters who were trained in camps in Afghanistan and 
graduated as expert terrorists; and third is a new and growing generation of followers who, 
although they may never have left their countries of residence, have embraced the core elements 
of the Al-Qaida message. Given that the Committee is devoting increasing attention to the third 
group, I wish to encourage the Council to make clear to Member States that the word 'associated' 
must also cover such groups so that the sanctions regime can be adapted to the new threats." 
206 See the following statement of the representative of Liechtenstein in UNSC (20 July 2005) 
Verbatim Record S/PV.5229 (Resumption 1), 8: "Current discussions on an improved sanctions 
regime also deal with the question of which individuals, groups, undertakings and entities can be 
considered as being "associated with" Al-Qaida for the purpose of listings. This is a welcome 
exercise that takes into account the structure of Al-Qaida and the nature of the threat it poses. The 
draft currently under discussion, however, entails the danger that such a definition could become 
too sweeping and include third parties that have some relationship to those targeted and that 
might factually contribute, in an inadvertent manner, to terrorist activities. In accordance with our 
legal understanding, knowledge and intent are indispensable mental elements of criminal liability 
and must thus be included in such a definition. This would also be in line with international legal 
standards such as those established by the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, to which we are a party." 
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VICTO~IA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
Many States have complained that the way in which the list is managed 
violates fundamental norms of due process. The open Security Council meeting 
on 30 July 2005 evidences a general concern among States about the lack of clear 
criteria for the addition of names to the list and the lack of adequate safeguards 
for those who are on the list.207 
1 The need for due process protections 
Those who are placed on the 1267 Committee's list face very serious 
curtailment of their liberties. Indeed, the "effects of a freezing order, if it is 
effectively implemented, are devastating for the target".208 Such ramifications 
are entirely appropriate for those who are truly terrorists. However, as it was 
noted at the International Conference of Jurists in November 2004, the human 
rights restrictions that result from blacklisting make it "essential that there are 
strong safeguards in place to check, in all senses of the word, the way in which 
national and international authorities use the power to blacklist organisations and 
individuals". 209 
In light of all this, and the huge effect that the sanctions have on those 
designated, one would be forgiven for thinking it abhorrent that the power to 
make designation decisions rests in a political body as the 1267 Committee. 
However, this is a necessary evil in order to achieve the purpose of the sanctions. 
If designation decisions were subject to due process protections of a nature 
required for criminal proceedings, the assets of terrorists would dissipate before 
any freezing order could be obtained. 
Due process protections of this nature are not required due to the fact that 
these sanctions are generally not considered to be criminal penalties.210 However, 
207 UNSC (20 July 2005) Verbatim Record S/PC.5229. 
208 Iain Cameron "European Union Anti-Terrorist Blacklisting" (2003) 3 Human Rights Law 
Review 225,227. 
209 Bill Bowring and Douwe Korff "Terrorist Designation with Regard to European and 
International Law: The Case of the PMOI" (International Conference of Jurists, Paris, 10 
November 2004), 30. 
210 Peter Gutherie "Security Council Sanctions and the Protection of Individual Rights" (2004) 60 
NYU Ann Surv Am L 491, 502-508. 
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they certainly contain a punitive element given the severity of their effects on 
individuals and entities listed.211 As such, some form of due process protections 
are required. 
2 Protections at the international level 
(a) The process 
The Committee adds names to the List largely on the basis of trust in the 
intelligence of the designating State. Although States are required, when 
submitting names, to give information to the greatest extent possible that 
demonstrates the individual's or entity's association with Al-Qaida or the Taliban, 
this is a cursory requirement.21 2 Once an individual is listed, all States are under 
a binding obligation to impose the required sanctions. 
Very few limits were placed on the 1267 Committee's discretion to 
decide which particular individuals and entities should be sanctioned. Thus, the 
power of the 1267 Committee to make decisions on the individual responsibility 
of non-State actors is broad and unparalleled. The only substantive limitation is 
that the targets must be "associated" with the Taliban or Al-Qaida. This 
limitation is minor given the broad definition of the word "associated".213 
No judicial finding of wrongdoing is needed and there is no standard 
against which "guilt" is assessed. There is no legal test that requires any 
knowledge or intention elements. There is no evidentiary burden to be met. 
Within this context, determinations that an "association" exists are by definition 
arbitrary. 
211 See the following statement of the representative of Switzerland (UNSC (20 July 2005) 
Verbatim Record S/PC.5229 (Resumption 1), 9). "Furthermore, while targeted sanctions are 
intended to be preventive in nature, they are punitive in their effects, and the rights of individuals 
under domestic and international law are severely affected." 
2 12 UNSC Resolution 1526 (30 January 2004) S/RES/1526(2004), para 17. 
213 See above for the definition. 
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The only procedural limitation is that consensus of the Committee 
members is required.214 There are currently very few safeguards for those who 
have made it onto the list. Specifically, individuals are not notified of their 
presence on the list. Once designated and put on the list, there is no time limit 
for when that designation runs out. This means that the sanctions apply for life 
unless the Security Council decides otherwise. There exists no formal 
mechanism for an independent review or appeal of the listings and a listed 
individual or entity cannot directly petition the Committee for delisting, or even 
obtain an explanation for the designation. 
(b) The Swedish case 
The first time substantial concerns were raised about the lack of adequate 
due process protections occurred in the case of three Swedish individuals 
claiming to have been wrongly listed.215 Based on United States' intelligence, 
the 1267 Committee added the three Somali-born Swedish citizens to the list on 
9 November 2001.216 These individuals were allegedly associated with the non 
profit Al Barakaat International Foundation, which was accused of terrorist 
financing. 217 
Swedish financial institutions implemented the sanctions, as was required 
by European Union regulations, by freezing the bank accounts of these three 
individuals.218 The individuals protested their innocence claiming that they had 
no knowledge that Al Barakaat had any link to terrorism.219 With no avenue for 
judicial review of the listing decision, lawyers for the individuals brought 
proceedings for interim relief before the European Court of Justice seeking an 
annulment of the European Council regulation that implemented the sanctions.220 
214 This limitation is not substantial as members of the Committee pay a large amount of 
deference to the decision of a State to submit a name for inclusion on the list. 
215 Gutherie, above n 210, 51 l. 
216 Gutherie, above n 210, 511. 
217 Case T-306/01 R Aden v Council and Commission [2002] ECR II-2387, para 27. 218 "The Security Council's Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of Al-Qaida/Taliban 
Sanctions", above n 155, 749-750. 
219 "The Security Council's Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of Al-Qaida/Taliban 
Sanctions", above n 155, 750. 
22° Case T-306/01 R Aden v Council and Commission [2002] ECR II-2387. 
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It was argued that the sanctions impeded their fundamental rights, in particular 
the right to a fair hearing. 221 Interim relief was denied due to the urgency 
condition not being satisfied. 
The individuals also petitioned the Swedish government, which then 
approached the United States government to obtain the information that led to the 
addition of their names onto the 1267 Committee's List.222 A representative of 
the Swedish Police, after reviewing the information, concluded that it contained 
nothing that proved the allegations. 223 The Swedish government subsequently 
filed a request with the 1267 Committee to have the names of the three 
individuals removed from the list. However, despite support from the majority 
of the Committee, objections from the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Russia prevented the Committee from reaching the necessary consensus.224 
Sweden then entered into bilateral negotiations with the United States and 
it was only after the United States was provided with detailed personal histories 
of the individuals concerned that the United States requested that two of the three 
individuals be removed from the List. 225 
(c) Current delisting guidelines 
Following this incident the Committee adopted guidelines on delisting 
procedures. 226 The delisting procedure follows closely what occurred in the 
Swedish case. A listed individual must petition its government of residence or 
citizenship (the petitioned government) to review the case and approach 
bilaterally the government that originally proposed the listing (designating 
221 Case T-306/01 R Aden v Council and Commission [2002] ECR II-2387, para 62. 
222 Gutherie, above n 210, 512. 
223 Gutherie, above n 210, 512. 
224 "The Security Council's Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of Al-Qaidaffaliban 
Sanctions", above n 155, 750. 
225 Gutherie, above n 210, 512. The third remains listed. 
226 UNSC 1267 Committee "Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work'' 
(7 November 2002, amended on 10 April 2003) 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/l267Template.htm> (last accessed 22 August 2005). 
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government) to persuade that government to seek or allow delisting. 227 
Consensus, as usual, is required. 
Many States argue that these guidelines do not provide adequate due 
process protections.228 Indeed the High-level Panel Report notes that "[t]he way 
entities or individuals are added to the terrorist list maintained by the Council 
and the absence of review or appeal for those listed raise serious accountability 
issues and possibly violate fundamental human rights norms and conventions."229 
The current review mechanism relies purely on the willingness of the petitioned 
government to argue the petitioner's case, and also the willingness of the 
designating State and ultimately all members of the 1267 Committee to agree on 
delisting. 
3 Protections at the domestic level 
(a) The need for domestic protections 
The obligation placed on States to sanction those on the 1267 
Committee's list can potentially place States in conflict with their human rights 
obligations. This potential conflict is evident from the Monitoring Team's report 
in February 2005, which stated that at least thirteen lawsuits have been filed 
around the world directly related to the sanctions. 230 Most lawsuits have not 
directly challenged the 1267 Committee's decision to list, but have instead 
challenged the legality of the laws that implemented the sanctions. 231 The 
argument is that the "State or regional body implementing the sanctions failed to 
227 UNSC 1267 Committee "Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work'' 
(7 November 2002, amended on lO April 2003), para 7(d) 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/l267Template.htm> (last accessed 22 August 2005). 228 See the various comments of States in UNSC (20 July 2005) Verbatim Record S/PV.5229. 
For example, the representative comments that "several countries have voiced concern that the 
listing and delisting procedures do not live up to the principles of due process. Some countries 
have even stated that they will not be able to propose names for inclusion on the Committee's list 
until those concerns have been addressed." 
229 UN Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change "A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility" (2 December 2004) N59/565, 47. 
230 "Second Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 169, 16. 
231 Gutherie, above n 2 IO, 5 I 9. 
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abide by, among other principles, fundamental norms of due process, right to 
property and freedom of association. "232 
Given the lack of adequate procedural protections at the international 
level, and the constitutional or international obligations of States to guarantee 
some protections of due process, some States have included in their laws that 
implement the sanctions regime, their own mechanisms that seek ensure 
procedural fairness. New Zealand is an example of such a State. 
(b) New Zealand's protections 
New Zealand's legal framework allowing for the implementation of asset 
freezes against those on the 1267 Committee's list exists by virtue of the 
Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. The asset freeze regime is premised on an 
individual, group or body first being designated as a "terrorist entity" by the 
Prime Minister.233 The Prime Minister may make such designations if certain 
statutory criteria are met, which essentially require some evidence of 
involvement in a "terrorist act" (as defined).234 The fact that an entity is on the 
1267 Committee's list is "sufficient evidence" of involvement.235 
When the Act came into force, all names appearing on the 1267 
Committee's list were treated as if the Prime Minister had made a final 
designation in respect of them. 236 Since then, the Prime Minister has made 
designations in relation to each individual or entity as and when they are added to 
the 1267 Committee's list.237 The effect of the designation is to freeze the assets 
232 "Second Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 169, 16. 
233 UNSC 1267 Committee "Report of New Zealand as Required under United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1455" (17 April 2003) S/AC.37/2003/(1455)/21, 3. 
234 The Prime Minister may make an interim designation under section 20 of the Terrorism 
Suppression Act 2002 if the Prime Minister has "good cause to suspect" the required involvement 
in a terrorist act. This designation lapses after 30 days unless a final designation is made. A final 
designation may be made if the Prime Minister "believes on reasonable ground" the required 
involvement exists. 
235 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 , s 31. 
236 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 , s 75. 
237 UNSC 1267 Committee "Report of New Zealand as Required under United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1455" (17 April 2003) S/AC.37/2003/(1455)/21, 3. However, there will be a 
certain space in time between the addition of a name to the 1267 Committee's list and a 
designation by the Prime Minister. Indeed, in the Parliamentary debate over the Terrorism 
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of the entity because it is an offence to knowingly deal with property owned or 
controlled by designated entities or to make property or financial related services 
available to such an entity.238 
The Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 provides the following safeguards 
for designated entities: The entity is notified of the Prime Minister's 
designation; 239 judicial review of the designation is available; 240 the Prime 
Minister may revoke a designation; 241 and there is a time limit on the 
designation. 242 
4 Conflicting obligations 
Arguably the binding obligation on States to impose sanctions on those 
on the 1267 Committee's list leaves no room for States to put in place their own 
safeguards. Although States may be bound by international human rights 
instruments to provide such safeguards, Article 103 of the Charter makes it clear 
that obligations Member States owe under the Charter prevail over obligations 
under any international treaty. 243 Thus, if New Zealand for example did not 
implement the sanctions against a listed individual because the domestic judicial 
review proceedings found the designation to be unwarranted, or the statutory 
time limit applied, then New Zealand would be in breach of the Charter.244 
Alternatively, if a State simply implemented the sanctions without 
providing procedural safeguards, the State may breach international human rights 
Suppression Amendment Bill (No 2), Dr the Hon Lockwood Smith noted that the 1267 
Committee's list contained l3 more designations than New Zealand's list of designated terrorists 
((14 June 2005) 626 NZPD 21646). 
238 UNSC 1267 Committee "Report of New Zealand as Required under United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1455" (17 April 2003) S/AC.37/2003/(1455)/21, 5. 
239 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, ss 21 and 23. 
240 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, s 33. 
241 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, s 34. 
242 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, s 35. It should be noted that the Terrorism Suppression 
Amendment (No 2) Act 2005 extended the time limit another two years in order to avoid the 
untenable scenario of the Attorney General having to make hundreds of applications to the High 
Court to extend the designations that were due to expire. It will be interesting to see what 
happens in a couple of years when this period runs out. 
243 UN Charter, art 103. 
244 See Gutherie, above n 210, 517. 
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instruments or its law may breach the States own constitutional requirements.245 
This current state of affairs is undesirable. States should not be put in such a 
difficult position. 246 It is submitted that the issue of conflicting international 
duties could be avoided if effective safeguards are put in place at the 
international level. 
In an open meeting of the Security Council on 20 July 2005, many States 
called on the Security Council to improve the Committee's listing and delisting 
procedures. 247 Numerous suggestions were made. 248 Switzerland's 
representative called for "transparent factual and evidentiary requirements with 
respect to the listing of individuals and groups".249 Most believed that targeted 
individuals and entities should be informed of their listing. Furthermore, there 
were calls for the duration of the sanctions to be limited. With respect to 
delisting, many called for individuals to be able to directly petition the 
Committee or an independent review body. Under such a process, the 
Committee would still retain the final decision making power.250 
These concerns of States need to be addressed in order to increase the 
perceived legitimacy of the sanctions regime. The current regime interferes with 
States' constitutional structures and international obligations by obliging them to 
apply the sanctions regardless of whether they breach fundamental due process 
norms. The Security Council could make an explicit allowance for States to 
implement due process protections at the domestic level. However, this would 
result in inconsistent protections and thus inconsistent implementation of the 
regime. It is submitted that the Security Council should take responsibility for 
protecting the due process rights of non-State actors by implementing protections 
at the international level. This is necessary not just in terms of human rights 
245 Gutherie, above n 210, 517. 
246 Liechtenstein made this comment in an open Security Council meeting (UNSC (12 January 
2004) Verbatim Record S/PV.4892), 25: "States must not be put in a difficult position with 
regard to their judicial and constitutional standards because of their commitment to implement 
measures imposed by the Council." 
247 UNSC (20 July 2005) Verbatim Record S/PV.5229. 
248 Denmark, Greece, Liechtenstein, Switzerland all made suggestions on how the procedures 
could be improved. 
249 UNSC (20 July 2005) Verbatim Record S/PV.5229 (Resumption l), 9. 
250 UNSC (20 July 2005) Verbatim Record S/PV.5229, 16. 
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protections, but in order to increase the willingness of States to implement the 
sanctions and submit names to the list. 
C Actual Results 
As stated above, the Security Council must be judged to a large extent by 
the actual results it produces. Thus it is necessary to inquire into how effective 
the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime has been in ensuring that these groups 
are denied the means to commit terrorist acts. It terms of the asset freeze, 32 
States have reported to have taken action to freeze assets of those listed, 
amounting to a total of US$91 million worth of assets frozen as at 30 June 
2005.251 
This figure certainly indicates some success, but it does not tell the true 
story of how much affect the sanctions regime is having on Al-Qaida and the 
Taliban. The reality is that the sanctions regime "has had a limited impact."252 
In addition to the problems with the regime outlined above, the sanctions are not 
achieving results that have been hope for because of the changed nature of the 
threat. Indeed, the Monitoring Team observed: "As a result of national and 
international action, Al-Qaida's funding has decreased significantly. But so has 
its need for money."253 
For example, the Bali bombings in 2002 are estimated to have cost less 
that $50,000, the 2004 attacks in Madrid about $10,000.254 Further, the main 
threat posed by Al-Qaida is characterised by start-up groups that have never had 
any contact with the Al-Qaida leadership and many of whom have never left 
their country of residence.255 Security Council sanctions are largely unable to 
curb this threat. 
251 "Third Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 185, 21. 
252 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 9. 
253 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 12. 
254 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 12. 
255 "Third Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 185, 8: "The final group is made up of new 
recruits who have become or are being radicalized by world events or by extremists in their 
communities who have already been seduced by the Al-Qaida message, or even by terrorist 
websites and in chat rooms on the Internet. Members of this group form cells locally without any 
direction from or contact with a central leadership. These cells are emerging as the main tlrreat 
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Although this is so, the sanctions are very important in stopping 
elaborately planned and highly funded acts of terrorism. 256 Thus, despite the 
many problems in sanctioning non-State actors, they are a legitimate tool to be 
used. They have a real effect on the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Simply because the sanctions are difficult to apply does not mean that 
they are worthless. Every effort must be made to deny terrorists the means to 
commit terrorism. 
It will be interesting to see whether the Security Council will extend the 
sanctions regime to terrorist groups not associated with Al-Qaida and the Taliban. 
It is submitted that before this can happen, States must agree on a clear definition 
of terrorism so that the scope of such a sanctions regime can be accurately 
determined. Furthermore, whenever the Security Council applies a sanctions 
regime to non-State actors it should ensure that adequate due process protections 
are in place. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The United Nations Charter was drafted, and the Security Council was 
created, at a time when States were the principle threat to international peace and 
security. Indeed the United Nations was largely created "to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war".257 Today the United Nations is no longer 
solely concerned with avoiding inter-State conflict. Terrorism, once considered 
to be the domain of domestic legal processes, has become one of the most serious 
threats to international peace and security.258 
posed by Al-Qaida terrorism today. They are bound to the AI-Qaida leadership by an overall 
unity of purpose but remain independent, anonymous and largely invisible until they strike. They 
can be found in most areas of the world, in Muslim and non-Muslim countries alike, and 
comprise people from a wide range of social and educational background, age and ethnicity." 
256 "First Report of the Monitoring Team", above n 140, 12. 
257 Preamble to the UN Charter. 
258 At the recent 2005 World Summit, world leaders strongly condemned "terrorism in all its 
forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it 
constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security." UNGA "2005 
World Summit Outcome" (20 September 2005) Af60.L. I, para 81 . 
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The Security Council has certainly proved its flexibility by responding to 
this threat. Through its legislative resolutions and the work of the CTC, the 
Security Council has successfully directed the multilateral effort against 
terrorism with a sense of urgency while fostering the required cooperation 
needed to ensure willing implementation of the norms. Furthermore, the 
Security Council has imposed a sanctions regime on individuals whose full 
identity and geographical whereabouts are uncertain, succeeding to a certain 
extent in denying Al-Qaida and the Taliban the means to carry out large scale 
attacks. 
Although the Security Council has indeed been responsive, its actions 
have raised some serious issues that impact on its credibility and ultimately on 
the effectiveness of its response. 
In terms of the Security Council's assumption of legislative powers, it is 
submitted that despite its inadequacies as a legislator, it may be necessary for the 
Security Council assume this role in certain circumstances. The success of 
Resolution 1373 (2001) shows that the prescription of general rules can a very 
effective tool for the Security Council to use against a threat such as terrorism 
that is global and not limited in time. Although the Security Council is not an 
ideal legislator, its legislation does have the advantage of conveying the 
necessary operational message. 
However, the availability of legislative powers as an effective tool for the 
Security Council depends ultimately on the perceived legitimacy of such actions. 
If States perceive particular Security Council legislation to be illegitimate or 
illegal, the obligations would not receive the support required for meaningful 
implementation. 
It is submitted that Security Council legislation will only be legitimate in 
emergency situations where the traditional means of law making are inadequate. 
The Security Council is in essence a body that has the power to act swiftly in 
times of emergencies. It is not an omnipotent legislator. Furthermore, Security 
Council legislation will generally only be effective if there is broad consensus 
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behind the norms being created. Thus, the Security Council should allow 
participation in the drafting of the obligations in order to ensure that the 
obligations are widely supported. 
In regard to the Security Council sanctioning role, States should not be 
put in the difficult position of having their constitutional or international law 
human rights obligations conflict with the obligation they owe to sanction those 
designated by the 1267 Committee. It is submitted that the Security Council 
should implement adequate due process protections in order to ensure the 
protection of individual's rights and the effective implementation of the sanctions. 
In particular, the delisting procedures of the 1267 Committee are grossly 
inadequate. Designated individuals and entities should be able to directly 
petition the 1267 Committee or some independent review board for delisting. 
Any future sanctions regime targeting non-State actors should implement these 
recommendations. 
These issues that this paper has raised form part of a common theme that 
the effectiveness of Security Council action against a global threat such as 
terrorism depends on the willingness of States to take action. Terrorism 
represents perhaps the most potent example of a threat that recognises no 
boundary and thus one that requires concerted action within the framework of 
multilateral cooperation. The traditional coercion role of the Security Council 
has limited application. If the Security Council wishes to remain effective in its 
response to this global threat it needs to be responsive to States' concerns. 
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